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The current planning paradigms of Rohingya refugee camps lie at the intersection 
of impermanence and adhocracy. This study seeks to explore the extent to which adhocracy 
has contributed to a strategy of impermanence in the Rohingya refugee camp, and how 
adhocracy has limited recognition of the human rights of Rohingya refugees and served to 
discount the spirit of the Rohingya community as reflected in their everyday practices. The 
study underscores the fact that refugees are seen as subjects of exclusion, blurring the line 
between permanence and impermanence in the planning domain. Also, by pursuing 
strategies of negotiation and appropriation of space as part of everyday practices, Rohingya 
refugees do not accept their status as refugees nor do they wish to be incorporated into the 
host community.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
My life 
 
Here’s my life in brief . . . 
I was a frog in a well, 
A prisoner in the jail of fresh air. 
In the dark, dark cosmos, 
No days, just nights, nights. 
 
A small cormorant survives 
the genocidal waves 
by being flung, crashing 
into the world’s strangeness. 
 
Storm of racism, of hate — 
This is my life. 
 
Just like an action movie 
In which you are the gangster. 
Just like an actor who cannot discover his lines. 
 
In Arakan, they kill and bury you 
under the treasure of human rights 
 
—Farooq Pacifist (Bryne, n.d.) 
Farooq’s poem reflects his life journey as a Rohingya, from witnessing dark days 
as a victim of statelessness, structural exclusion, racism, persecution, war crimes and 
genocide in his own country of Myanmar to living a life as a refugee, barely surviving, 
traumatized, confined to an uncertain existence in the Kutupalong-Balukhali Extension 
Camp, the world’s largest refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. This story is not only 
Farooq’s: his words reflect the situation of most Rohingya refugees, who are among the 
most persecuted ethnic minorities in the world. Rohingyas, a Muslim minority ethnic 
group, has been enduring persecution by the ruling junta of Myanmar, a predominantly 
Buddhist country. Their sufferings have been ignored by the international community for 
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over five decades, making them ‘the world’s most friendless people’ (Tharoor, 2017). From 
late 2017 to early 2018, around 700,000 Rohingya crossed the borders between Bangladesh 
and Myanmar to escape an aggressive Myanmar military campaign that devastated 
hundreds of Rohingya villages in Rakhine state in Myanmar. The Rohingyas fled to 
Bangladesh, the only country that left its border open during this crisis, and joined 200,000 
more Rohingyas in the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, who had previously 
fled to Bangladesh to evade Myanmar’s state-sponsored persecution and abuses. Over the 
course of only five months, a hilly forest area in Cox’s Bazar became a mega refugee 
settlement with a population larger than Lyon, France’s third-largest city. Rohingya 
refugees in the overcrowded camps soon became vulnerable to the risks from landslides, 
floods, disease outbreaks, and tensions within the community (UNHCR, n.d.). Providing 
sustainable and resilient lives for these large influxes of Rohingya people has become a 
great challenge for Bangladesh.   
 
In our globalized world, the movement of people often has been seen as a threat to 
individual nations’ perceived security and collective resources. Billions of dollars are being 
invested in the mapping, enclosing, and bounding of territories, dramatically restricting the 
movement of people (Jones, 2016). Therefore, when people are forced to flee from war, 
racial and political intolerance, or natural disasters to seek refuge in other countries, they 
fall under national and international law instruments that decide their ‘status’, ‘rights’ and 
‘dignity’ by which their social power in the host society will be defined. At this moment, 
the world is witnessing the highest level of displacement on record, with 30 million 
refugees trapped in refugee settlements or camps, sometimes for several generations 
(United Nations, n.d.).  
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By framing the displacement of people fleeing war, persecution, and violence as a 
short-term problem, refugee camps emerged to offer acute and temporary accommodation 
and services to displaced refugees. The hope was that every conflict would be successfully 
resolved through dialogue and policymaking and that every refugee would either go back 
to his/her country, would relocate to another country, or would gain citizenship in the host 
country. However, geopolitical realities have compelled refugees to live in a refugee camp 
on average for 17 years per UN estimates (Sabie et. al, 2017). Even after ‘successful’ 
resettlements, refugee camps often remain the place where they had the longest and stable 
period of ‘residency’ (Tang, 2015). These realities have led to the question, do temporary 
arrangements for refugees allow them to live their lives as dignified human beings? 
 
Refugee camps have been treated as a space that denotes extraterritoriality, 
exception, and exclusion. This has led refugee camps to be viewed as places to keep 
refugees captive, detached from the outside ‘normal’ world, and only allowed to live a 
‘bare life,’ merely existing without social, political, and economic power. However, 
another view imagines refugee camps as sources of resiliency neoliberalism, where 
refugees are turned into neoliberal citizens who can adapt to the camp environment and 
assume responsibility to transform the camp into a community, but without challenging the 
status quo. I argue that these two perspectives of the camp are not mutually exclusive. They 
both play vital roles in shaping everyday decisions in terms of refugee camp planning and 
development, and also serve to reproduce the rationality of impermanence in refugee camp 
planning. Drawing inspiration from Turner (2015) and Simone (2008), I argue that “the de-
politicization of the life in refugee camp paradoxically produces hyper-politicized space 
where nothing is taken for granted and everything is contested” (Turner, 2015, p.139). 
Hence refugees are not devoid of agency. Instead, they should be understood as one of the 
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actors in the planning field, whose everyday practices and cultural and spatial appropriation 
of the socio-spatial environment provide them with the capacity to frustrate or facilitate 
planning outcomes.  My research questions are, therefore: (1) How is the notion of 
impermanence materialized through the development and management of Rohingya 
refugee settlements in Bangladesh?; (2) How do refugees negotiate these development and 
management approaches, and (3) What does this agency entail for planning with refugees 
and other transient populations? 
 
To examine these questions, I employed ethnographic research methods to 
document the underlying planning challenges and refugees’ everyday practices in the 
Rohingya refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, Chittagong, Bangladesh. The research methods 
included mapping, observation, and semi-structured interviews with 15 Rohingya refugees 
and 13 professional experts including planners, architects, engineers, researchers, aid 
organizations, and NGO workers working inside and outside of the camp. Pseudonyms are 
used in this study in order to protect the identity of the interview participants. I conducted 
my study from June to August 2019, which allowed me to document the struggles of the 
Rohingya refugees during two different extreme seasons in Bangladesh: summer and 
monsoon. I spent three weeks in Cox’s Bazar, traveling every day except local holidays to 
camp early in the morning and returning in the evening, as visitors are not allowed to stay 
in the camps overnight. I spent my days in the Rohingya refugee camp observing and taking 
field notes and photographs, and interviewing refugees and experts who work within the 
refugee camp. Over the course of another four weeks, I interviewed professionals who 
work remotely on different projects in the camp. Through my interviews and observations, 
I sought to document what factors and what actors shape planning decisions, 
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implementation, and outcomes in order to more broadly understand how the assumption of 
impermanence affects or is affected by refugee camp planning practices. 
 
It took a long time to secure interviews with refugees, as they were not comfortable 
sharing their experiences with an outsider they just met. I spent three days visiting two 
women-friendly spaces in two different camps to build a relationship of familiarity and 
trust. I also attended an international workshop titled ‘Rohingya Crisis in Bangladesh: 
Challenges and Resolutions’ organized by the Department of Anthropology, University of 
Chittagong, to gain an understanding of how local researchers are engaged with the 
production of knowledge around the Rohingya refugee crisis. My random conversations 
with rickshaw pullers, taxi drivers, and restaurant workers while I was in Cox’s Bazar and 
Chittagong also helped me to understand the perspectives of the host community, 
especially the perspectives of the working class about the Rohingya refugees. The 
limitations of my study include the absence of perspectives of government officials and the 
lack of Rohingya male perspectives about life in a refugee camp. Being a female researcher 
conducting a study in a conservative patriarchal refugee society, I was not afforded the 
opportunity to interact with Rohingya male refugees. Only five of the 15 Rohingya refugee 
interviewees were male, and I was only able to get in contact with them only through the 
help of a local NGO. My requests to interview Bangladeshi government officials were 
denied. 
 
As a professional focusing on the development of the built environment both as a 
planner and as an architect, my scholarly and professional commitments are rooted in 
promoting the evolution of humane urbanism. This is a form of urbanism where, rather 
than following hegemonic planning practices, planning, and design practices are directed 
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towards creating just cities that celebrate the culture and histories of diverse communities, 
recognizing local level knowledge production, and providing spaces for equitable 
participation in planning and design processes (Okitasari, 2016; Miraftab, 2016). The 
current world that is torn with wars, violence, poverty, and exclusion is in dire need of such 
approaches to planning in order to make the world more inclusive, resilient, and 
sustainable. As a proponent of this approach to planning, I do not believe in the planning, 
development, and creation of refugee camps where the value of human life is stripped down 
to a bare minimum. Instead, I believe in every person’s right to stay in place and his/her 
right to move without being forced. In addition to ensuring the safety and security of the 
refugees, the camp should emerge as a space that promotes every opportunity for the 
refugees to grow and hope for a better future irrespective of his/her citizenship identity. 
 
This research seeks to contribute to planning, humane urbanism, as well as critical 
refugee studies. Through her study of Vietnamese refugees, Yen Le Espiritu argues that 
this emergent field of study “refuses to locate the refugee as an object to be studied, a 
problem to be solved, or a legal classification to be dissected,” and she critiques “the 
construction of the ‘good refugee’ who represents a solution to the nation-state’s failure” 
(Le Espiritu, 2014, p.91, 104; Tang 2015, p.7). My study situates refugees at the 
intersection of geopolitical and socio-cultural constructs where refugees and their everyday 
experiences make them a successful negotiating actor rather than a helpless passive 
recipient of aids. This study also seeks to contribute to planning theory, especially in terms 
of planning and development of seemingly impermanent or transient places like refugee 
camps. In the planning and governance systems of the refugee camps, a privileging of 
instrumental rationality leads to a ‘top-down’ approach where the complexity of place, 
time, and users are elided. Instead, I propose a ‘multiplanar’ (Hillier, 2008) approach to the 
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planning of such spaces, where every dimension of a plan – people, place, time – are subject 
to continuous change. 
 
In the following ‘Chapter 2: Background’, I historicize and analyze the Rohingya 
refugee crisis in the context of the world refugee scenario and the emergence of the 
conception and planning of refugee camps. In ‘Chapter 3: Literature Review,’ I analyze a 
broad and diverse range of literature to understand the scopes and challenges for resilient 
planning and governance of refugee camps in the context of impermanence and adhocracy. 
‘Chapter 4: Rohingya Refugee Camp’ describes the existing Rohingya refugee camp 
system, focusing on the built environment and the governance of the camp and the coping 
strategies of Rohingya refugees. Drawing primarily from data collected through interviews, 
‘Chapter 5: Emergence of Impermanence and Adhocracy’ focuses on the planning 
philosophies and challenges in the Rohingya refugee camp that accentuate the assumption 
of impermanence in the Rohingya refugee camp. ‘Chapter 6: Embracing the Challenges of 
Impermanence and Adhocracy’ highlights everyday practices of refugees that provide 
opportunities for alternative planning solutions, and more broadly serve to blur the 
distinctions between impermanence and permanency. Finally, in my conclusion, I reiterate 
the need for reevaluating the planning paradigms that shape Rohingya refugee camps in 
order to provide the Rohingya refugees with opportunities to lead a dignified human life. 
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Chapter 2: Background 
2.1. FORCED DISPLACEMENT- WORLDWIDE SCENARIO   
Every minute in 2018, 25 people were forced to flee. By the end of the year 2018, 
70.8 million people were forcibly displaced worldwide to avoid persecution, 
conflict, violence, or human rights violations – 25.9 million of them are refugees. 
One-third of the global refugee population i.e. 6.7 million people were hosted by 
the least developed countries. Nearly 4 out of 5 refugees lived in countries 
neighboring their countries of origin (UNHCR, 2019) 
What we are seeing in these figures is further confirmation of a longer-term rising 
trend in the number of people needing safety from war, conflict, and persecution” 
– Filippo Grandi, United Nations High Commissions for Refugees (UNHCR, 
2019, p.4). 
 
Every day, vulnerable communities in the world are becoming more vulnerable 
both socially, economically, and politically, and increasingly deprived of basic human 
rights. According to the World Bank, the refugee crisis becomes a development crisis when 
forcibly displaced communities take refuge in other least developed communities, leading 
to a need for longer-term social and economic solutions both for the displaced and for the 
host communities (The World Bank, n.d.). However, the rights, services, and assistance 
provided to forcibly displaced people differ depending on their status and type of forced 
displacement. Distinctions are often made between conflict-induced and disaster-induced 
displacement, but the lines between these two types often become blurred since conflicts 
can erupt because of disputes over natural resources, or disasters can be triggered by human 
activities like landslides (Migration Data Portal,  n.d.). 
 
The United Nations (UN) categorizes forcibly displaced population in the following 
ways (United Nations, n.d.): 
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Refugees: A refugee, according to the 1951 Convention, “is someone who is unable 
or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group, or political opinion” (UNHCR, n.d.).  
Asylum Seekers: “An asylum seeker is an individual who is seeking international 
protection. In countries with individualized procedures, an asylum seeker is someone 
whose claim has not yet been finally decided on by the country in which he or she has 
submitted it. Not every asylum seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee, but every 
refugee is initially an asylum seeker” (Amnesty International, 2019).  
Internally Displaced Persons: Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are “persons or 
groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places 
of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed 
conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-
made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border” 
(UNHCR, n.d.). 
Stateless Persons: A stateless person is “a person who is not considered as a 
national by any State under the operation of its law” (UNHCR, n.d.). “Statelessness 
situations are usually caused by discrimination against certain groups. Their lack of 
identification — a citizenship certificate — can exclude them from access to important 
government services, including health care, education, or employment” (United Nations, 
n.d.).  
Returnees: “Returnees are former refugees who return to their own countries or 
regions of origin after time in exile. Returnees need continuous support and reintegration 




2.2. GUIDELINES FOR REFUGEE RIGHTS 
The rights of refugees are protected by the 1951 Refugee Convention and are 
administered by UNHCR (United Nations High Commissions on Refugees). UNHCR was 
formed in 1951 by the General Assembly of the United Nations to manage the displaced 
persons affected by World War II and was specifically limited to persons fleeing events 
occurring before 1 January 1951 and within Europe. Later through an amendment known 
as the ‘1967 Protocol’, the geographic and temporal limits of the 1951 Convention were 
eliminated and the applicability of the convention as a ‘status and right-based instrument’ 
became universal. The fundamental principles of the convention notably include non-
discrimination, non-penalization, and non-refoulment. Although ‘non-discrimination’ is 
one of the founding principles of the Convention, the convention does not apply universally 
for all refugees. Those who have committed war crimes or crimes against humanity, have 
committed serious non-political crimes, or are guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations, are not protected by the Convention. Some classes of 
refugees are protected under other UN agencies, such as  Palestine refugees protected by 
the UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Work Agency), and refugees who have a status 
equivalent to nationals in their country of asylum are not protected by the 1951 Convention 
(United Nations, n.d.). 
 
Under the commitment of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, refugees are 
granted basic rights such as access to courts, to primary education, to work, and to the 
provision for documentation including a refugee travel document in passport form. The 
principle of non-refoulment provides further security to refugees, stating that ‘no one shall 
expel or return a refugee against his or her will, in any manner whatsoever, to a territory 
where he or she fears threats to life or freedom’ (United Nations, n.d.). The Convention 
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and the Protocol also delineate roles for UNHCR to play along with directions for States 
to cooperate with the UNHCR to exercise its functions. UNHCR thus serves as the 
‘guardian’ of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol and promotes international 
instruments for the protection of the refugees and supervising their application. UNHCR 
exercises its supervisory role in a number of ways, including by developing standards, 
interpreting standards, and applying them (United Nations, n.d.). 
 
2.3. REFUGEE CAMPS 
Refugees are perceived through the framework of a ‘problem-solving discourse’; 
that is, an anomaly that needs a solution (Nyers, 1998; Turner, 2016). Also, by framing 
refugees as a ‘product’ of unique or exceptional situations like war and natural disasters, 
refugee situations are ‘coined in the language of emergencies,’ and the humanitarian 
responses to these are similarly viewed as ‘emergency measures’ (Turner, 2016). Within 
this realm of emergency measures falls the idea of the ‘refugee camp’. 
 
According to the UNHCR definition, “Refugee camps are temporary facilities built 
to provide immediate protection and assistance to people who have been forced to flee due 
to conflict, violence or persecution. While camps are not intended to provide permanent 
sustainable solutions, they offer a safe haven for refugees where they receive medical 
treatment, food, shelter, and other basic services during emergencies” (USA for UNHCR, 
n.d.). Also as a safe humanitarian space, refugee camp includes security through a safe 
distance from the border no more than a day’s walk where possible, safe geographical 
features including easily accessible water supplies, stable grounds, shaded areas, waste 
management capabilities, and accessibility so that supplies can reach the camp through big 
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vehicles (USA for UNHCR, n.d.). Refugee camps have unique spatiality and temporality: 
“Just as they are lodged spatially between the open and the closed, camps exist between 
the temporary and the permanent. From the outset, camps are understood as having a 
limited, although sometimes indeterminate, duration” (Hailey, 2009, p.4).  
 
While refugee camps have become a containing place for a large number of 
refugees around the world, it is not an ultimate solution for the crisis. Even as a first 
responder to the refugee crisis, UNHCR does not advocate for the creation of camps. 
However, they provide standardized guidelines and mechanisms to ensure the delivery of 
services and facilities to refugees in camps or camp-like scenarios. The guidelines are 
available from the micro-scale shelter planning level to the macro-scale master plan level. 
For example, the shelter level guidelines from UNHCR include standards depicted in ‘The 
Sphere Handbook’, provide ‘Camp Planning Standards’ for the development of camps as 
part of a response to refugee influxes, and offer a ‘Master Plan Approach to Settlement 
Planning Guideline’ to keep the development of refugee camps in line with national 
development plans. 
 
2.4. ROHINGYA: FROM STATELESSNESS TO REFUGEES 
Rohingyas are an ethnic Muslim minority group mainly residing in the northern 
Rakhine state of Myanmar. Most Muslims in the Rakhine state claim ‘Rohingya’ as their 
ethnicity, while the majority population in Myanmar see the term Rohingya not as a 
representation of ethnical identity or cultural practices but “a gambit by a mixed-origin 
migrant group for greater political rights by claiming indigeneity under Mynamar law and 
through that to claim territory and self-governance” (Ware & Laoutides, 2018, p.16).  The 
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Myanmar government officially recognized 135 ethnic groups indigenous to Myanmar 
through its Union Citizenship Act in 1945 but excluded the Rohingyas, even though they 
have a history of living in Rakhine state for the last 200 years (Qadir & Gardezi, 2019).  In 
the Myanmar Census of 2014, an estimated 1 million people self-identified as Rohingya 
were living in three townships situated along the border of Bangladesh (Figure 1), making 
up 31% of the state’s population. However, the Census classified them as ‘not numerated’ 
and identified the Muslims in the northern Rakhine state as ‘Bengali’ instead of ‘Rohingya’  
(Leider, 2018; Blomquist & Cincotta2016; Ullah & Chattoraj, 2018).  Referring to the 
Rohingya population as ‘Bengalis’ underscores the perception of Rohingya as outsiders 
and illegal immigrants from Bangladesh and reflects the Myanmar Government’s attempt 






Figure 1: Concentration of major Ethnic groups in Myanmar, Source: Al-Jazeera 
Historians document the presence of the Rohingyas in an independent kingdom in 
Arakan, now known as Rakhine state from the 8th century, and their presence is 
corroborated by ancient mosques and coins and the use of Islamic titles by Arakan rulers 
(Qadir & Gardezi, 2019; Ullah & Chattoraj, 2018).  When Myanmar was under British rule 
from 1824-1948 and was known as Burma, Rohingyas served as government officials and 
received ration cards by the British Companies1. During British rule, there was a significant 
 
1 The British made Burma a province of India in 1886. The governance of all the Indian provinces were 
under the control of the British Empire and several British Companies monolopized trades, economy and 
infrastructures in Burma. For example, Irrawaddy Flotilla Company (IFC) was a passenger and 
cargo ferry company, which operated services on the Irrawaddy River in Burma. While British Companies 





migration of laborers from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh to then Burma. Since all those 
countries were under British colonial rule and Burma was administered as a province under 
India, such migrations were considered internal. However, after independence, the 
Myanmar government considered the migration that took place during British rule as 
illegal, and it is on this basis that they refuse citizenship to the majority of the Rohingya 
(Blakemore, 2019). For three years from 1942-1945 during British rule, Burma’s Arakan 
Division (present-day Rakhine State, and especially the Buddhist areas) were under the 
control of Japan, and in 1945 Britain liberated Burma from Japanese occupation with the 
support of Burmese nationalists and Rohingya fighters. The North Arakan Muslim leaders 
were requesting political autonomy in return for the assistance they provided, but the 
British did not fulfill their promise and instead excluded the Rohingyas from civil service 
positions and banned them from participating in political activities. Thus after gaining 
independence from British rule, the majority Burmese population resented the politically 
vocal Muslim communities (Al-Mahmood, 2016; Leider, 2018). 
 
In 1954, Burma’s first Prime Minister U Nu acknowledged the presence of the 
ethnic Rohingya community in the Arakan State, and in 1959 the first President of Burma 
Sao Shwe Thaike claimed that the ‘Muslims of Arakan’ certainly belong to the indigenous 
races of Burma. Rohingya were issued citizenship/ID cards and were granted the right to 
vote, and were allowed to work in the civil services. In the 1960s, the Official Burma 
Broadcasting Service (BBS) streamed a radio program in the Rohingya language three 
times a week as part of its minority language programming, and the term ‘Rohingya’ was 
used in journals and textbooks in schools until the late 1970s ( Macmanus, Green, & De la 




The Rohingya started to face state-sponsored persecution in 1962 when General Ne 
Win and his Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) seized power, eliminated the 
parliamentary system, and placed Myanmar under military rule. The junta conducted 
‘Operation Nagamin (Operation King Dragon)’ in 1977-1978 aimed at registering citizens 
and screening minorities and foreigners, and as a result, the Rohingya people lost their 
official documentation. The operation employed the ruthless ‘four cuts’ counter-
insurgency strategy (cut rebel access to foods, funds, intelligence, and recruits) (Ware & 
Laoutides, 2018). The Burmese military was also accused of human rights abuses including 
rape, destruction of houses and villages and mass arrests during this operation, and around 
200,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh to avoid the persecution (Buchanon, 2016; Ullah, 
2016; Ullah & Chattoraj, 2018; Blakemore, 2019). In 1982, General Ne Win’s government 
passed the Burmese Citizenship Law, which identified three levels of citizenship. To 
achieve naturalized citizenship, one’s family had to be living in Myanmar before 1948 and 
had to be familiar with at least one of the local dialects. The law also stated that people 
who migrated to then-Burma during the British colonial era were considered illegal 
immigrants and identified as ‘resident foreigners.’ Thus under the Citizenship Law, 
Rohingya people were stripped of their citizenship due to lack of adequate documentation 
and rendered stateless. 
 
Another targeted attempt against Rohingyas was ‘Operation Phi Thaya (Operation 
Clean and Beautiful Nation)’ in 1991. The operation reached its height when routine 
oppression turned to concerted brutality, with forced labor, land confiscations, destructions 
of mosques, rapes, and summary execution. This led to a massive exodus of 250,000 people 
in Bangladesh in the early 1990s. The manhunts and massacres were promoted with poetic, 
fanciful, warlike names—Dragon King, Clean and Beautiful Nation---as actions that 
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‘bestow glory on those who perpetrate them’ (Habiburahman & Ansel, 2019;  Ullah, 2016; 
Ware & Laoutides, 2018). With the help of UNHCR and other agencies, the Rohingya 
people were sheltered in the southeastern border region of Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh was not a signatory of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, and the country 
was reluctant to promote the social integration of those Rohingya refugees with the local 
community and decided to repatriate the refugees back to Myanmar in 1992. The process 
of repatriation started in May 1993 after a UN survey showed that 30% of Rohingya 
refugees were willing to return. By 1997, the Bangladeshi government had managed to 
push almost 230,000 Rohingya refugees back to Myanmar (Leider, 2018; Parnini, 2013; 
Qadir & Gardezi, 2019). 
 
Throughout the 1990s, NaSaKa, a mixed unit of the police, intelligence, and 
customs officers, advanced policies that created increasing hardship for the Rohingya, 
reducing freedom of movement, introducing restrictions on marriage and birth registration, 
and obstructing religious practices. Moreover, with a poverty rate of 78% compared to the 
37.5% national average, Rakhine State is the least developed state in Myanmar. 
Widespread poverty, poor infrastructure, and lack of employment opportunity exacerbated 
the cleavage between Buddhist and Muslim Rohingya, which at times resulted in conflict 
(Albert & Maizland, 2020). Two waves of violence took place between Rohingya Muslims 
and majority Buddhists in Rakhine State in 2012. Stokke, Vakulchuk & Overland (n.d.) 
characterized this as communal violence between Rakhine Buddhist and Rohingya groups, 
and military violence perpetrated by the military against Rohingya groups. A state of 
emergency followed and placed the region under military administration, but “communal 
antagonisms and violence rooted in both the local political economy of underdevelopment” 
and “the antagonistic politicization of ethnic and religious identities at the local and 
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national level” led to the continuation of the brutality (Ullah & Chattoraj, 2018, p. 554).  A 
report (2015) by ISCI (International State Crime Initiative) analyzed the persecution of the 
Rohingya against the six stages of genocide outlined by Daniel Feierstein: stigmatization 
(and dehumanization), harassment, violence and terror, isolation and segregation, 
systematic weakening, mass annihilation and symbolic enactment involving the removal 
of the victim group from the collective history. The analysis concluded that the Rohingya 
in Myanmar suffered the first four of six stages of genocide and that these genocidal 
processes had been orchestrated at the highest level of the national and the local Rakhine 
government: “the State’s persistent and intensified ‘othering’ of the Rohingya as outsiders, 
illegal Bengali immigrants, and potential terrorists has given a green light to Rakhine 
nationalists and Islamophobic monks to orchestrate invidious campaigns of race and 
religious hatred reminiscent of those witnessed in Germany in the 1930s and Rwanda in 
the early 1990s” (Macmanus, Green, & De la Cour Venning, 2015, p.99).   
 
In retaliation against the brutalities, in August 2017 the Rohingya militant group 
ARSA (Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army) attacked 30 police stations and an army base in 
Rakhine State, killing 12 Myanmar security forces. An atrocious response to that attack 
followed where security forces burned down scores of Rohingya villages, murdered 
thousands of civilians, and launched a campaign of rapes against Rohingya women and 
girls, leading more than 400,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh according to a UN 
estimate. Amnesty International said that Myanmar is trapping the Rohingyas who are left 
there in a ‘dehumanizing apartheid regime’ (Barany, 2019; Qadir & Gardezi, 2019; 




2.5. GLOBAL AND REGIONAL RESPONSES TO THE ROHINGYA REFUGEE CRISIS 
As a reaction to the recent 2017 exodus of Rohingya refugees, United Nations High 
Commissioner for human rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, described Myanmar’s treatment 
of its Muslim Rohingya minority to be ‘a textbook example of ethnic cleansing’ and 
denounced the ‘brutal security operation’ against the Rohingya in the Rakhine state (Safi, 
2017). Human rights groups and UN leaders suspect acts of genocide and human rights 
violation have taken place and reports by the UN fact-finding mission have corroborated 
the fact: 
The authorities of Myanmar, both military and civilian, have failed to condemn, 
investigate, or punish perpetrators of gross human rights violations. Rather, they 
have categorically denied violations, created legal obstacles to accountability, 
destroyed evidence of crimes, and actively nurtured and perpetuated a climate of 
impunity that has emboldened perpetrators. These acts are in violation of the 
international human rights norms and standards….. (OHCHR, 2018, p.409). 
 
The head of the fact-finding mission addressed the UN General Assembly on September 
2019 and added that  
……the cycle of impunity enables, and indeed fuels, this reprehensible conduct 
on the part of the security forces……the treatment of some 600,000 Rohingya 
remaining in Rakhine State is largely unchanged. Their situation has worsened, as 
they endure another year subjected to discrimination, segregation, movement 
restrictions, and insecurity, without adequate access to livelihoods, land, basic 
services, including education and health care, or justice for past crimes committed 
against them by the Tatmadaw…. (OHCHR, 2019). 
 
The Myanmar military was also included for the first time in the UN annual list of 
parties that have committed sexual violence in armed conflict, and the UN still keeps 
Myanmar on the list of countries that use and recruit child soldiers. Along with UN and 
human rights groups, international communities and Muslim countries, in particular, 
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criticized the Myanmar Government’s role and reaction to the 2017 Rohingya crisis. The 
United Kingdom became the first European country to denounce military persecution, and 
many other European countries also joined later. The United States reimposed trade and 
monetary sanctions on Myanmar in 2017, which had been lifted in December 2016 
following Myanmar’s apparent progress in improving the human rights situation in the 
country. The US State Department also downgraded Myanmar in 2018 Trafficking in 
Persons report2 to its lowest tier, tier 3 (Qadir & Gardezi, 2019; Ullah & Chattoraj, 2018; 
Human Rights Watch, 2018).  
   
In a recent international response in November 2019, the West African nation of 
Gambia, on behalf of the 57-nation Organization of Islamic Cooperation, filed a lawsuit 
with the International Court of Justice (ICC) against Myanmar accusing the country of 
violating the UN Genocide Convention. The Court unanimously ruled in January 2020 that 
Myanmar “must enact emergency measures to protect Rohingya from violence and 
preserve evidence of possible genocide.”  Separately, the ICC started an investigation into 
alleged atrocities in November 2019 (Heijmans, 2020; Albert & Maizland, 2020). 
 
Myanmar’s de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi, a Nobel laureate for human rights 
security and a champion of the democratic system, has been criticized for her dubious role 
throughout the crisis. As a reaction to the international media covering Rohingya crisis, 
Suu Kyi mentioned in September 2017 that her Government had “already started 
 
2 The 2018 Trafficking in Persons Report is an essential US State Department tool used to shed light on the 
darkness where modern slavery thrives and to highlight specific steps each government can take to protect victims 
of human trafficking, prevent trafficking crimes, and prosecute traffickers in the United States and around the 
world. Countries whose governments do not fully meet the Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s (TVPA) 
minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so are placed in Tier 3.  
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defending all the people in Rakhine in the best way possible” (Ellis-Peterson, 2018), but 
later she denied access and cooperation with the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights 
for the remainder of her term. Her approach of denial and persecution of Rohingya 
corroborates the fact that the genocide was state-sponsored, and the government’s role in 
this conflict was rather ‘escalatory than conciliatory’ (Ellis-Peterson, 2018; Qadir and 
Gardezi, 2018; Albert & Maizland, 2020).  
 
From a regional perspective, China and India, two countries that share borders with 
Myanmar, gave a cold shoulder to the Rohingya crisis because of their vested interests in 
the country. Taking a stance against complicating, expanding, or internationalizing the 
Rohingya issue, China keeps shielding Myanmar from ‘accountability and scrutiny, 
obstructing international action and weakening UN measures’ (Reuters, 2018; Human 
Rights Watch, 2019). While other countries have cut foreign funding to Myanmar, China 
expanded the investment in the country through the development project known as the 
‘China-Myanmar Economic Corridor’. India also announced the deportation of Rohingya 
people who fled to India for asylum, and also failed to take a regional leadership position 
in solving the Rohingya crisis between two nations—Myanmar and Bangladesh—with 
whom India had entered into many bilateral agreements. The three countries also share 
membership in different regional cooperative organizations such as BIMSTEC (Bay of 
Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) (Qadir & 




2.6. RESPONSE OF BANGLADESH TO THE ROHINGYA CRISIS 
Bangladesh shares a 271-kilometer long border with Myanmar which cuts through 
hills, forest, rivers, canals, and sea. The porosity of the border makes it difficult to navigate 
the political, economic, and security aspects of the bilateral relationship between two 
countries (Bashar, 2012; Parnini, 2013). Although Myanmar shares borders with four other 
countries, the number of Rohingya refugees entering Bangladesh has always been high 
compared to other countries because of cultural and religious affinities; also, the Rohingya 
language ‘Ruáingga’ is similar to the Chittagongian dialect used in south-eastern 
Bangladesh (Ullah, 2011). However, Bangladesh is a developing country burdened with 
recurring natural disasters, a high rate of population increase, and resultant congestion, and 
Rohingya refugees were always perceived as an economic burden on this resource-poor 
country. Rohingyas have been blamed for resisting Bangladesh and Myanmar authorities 
and for organized crime, including smuggling of arms and weapons and drug trafficking in 
border regions (Bashar, 2012.; Parnini, Othman & Ghazali, 2013; Ullah, 2011). Also, the 
deplorable living condition in the camps make the Rohingya refugees easy targets for 
recruitment by Islamic fundamentalists or criminal groups and makes them vulnerable to 
non-traditional and transnational security threats, maritime piracy, deadly violence, crimes, 
illegal human trafficking, and sex trafficking (Parnini et al., 2013).    
 
Before the 2017 exodus, Rohingya refugees fled to Bangladesh to avoid state-
sponsored persecution and violence in Myanmar in several episodes. Following the 1978 
exodus, the Bangladesh Government set up 20 refugee camps for them. However, after the 
repatriation of most refugees by 1997, all camps were closed except two: Nayapara camp 
in Teknaf and Kutupalong camp in Ukhiya, with around 22,000 refugees. Some of the 
refugees left the camps, and, given the similarities of language and cultural familiarity, 
 
 23 
were able to obtain jobs throughout the Chittagong district (Ullah, 2011). The initial 
response of Bangladesh to the most recent Rohingya refugee crisis was commended by the 
International community. While other countries were building walls, pushing asylum 
seekers back at the borders and deporting people without adequately considering their 
protection claims, Bangladesh welcomed 900,000 Rohingya refugees who escaped from 
religion and ethnicity-based persecution in Myanmar in 2017. Today, the Kutupalong-
Balukhali extension camp, sometimes referred to as a ‘mega-camp’ is the largest refugee 
camp in the world (Human Rights Watch, 2018). However, as Bangladesh is not a signatory 
of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, the Rohingya refugees lack recognized 
refugee status and any rights associated with this status from the Bangladeshi government. 
All of the Rohingya refugees who have arrived Bangladesh after 2017 are designated as 
“Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals,” making them vulnerable to “denial of freedom 
of movement, access to public services, education, and livelihoods, as well as to arrest and 
exploitation” ( Human Rights Watch, 2018, p. 4). 
 
As an overpopulated country with a weak infrastructural system, Bangladesh is 
eager to initiate the repatriation process of Rohingya refugees. A tentative agreement was 
signed between Bangladesh and Myanmar in 2017 to repatriate the refugees in a ‘voluntary, 
safe, dignified, and sustainable’ manner. Following that agreement, however, two 
repatriation attempts in 2018 failed in the face of protests by Rohingya refugees and the 
lack of willingness on the part of the Myanmar government to take the Rohingya refugees 
back. The Myanmar government had already bulldozed the burnt villages of Rohingyas 
and started rebuilding ‘common villages’ where homes would be occupied by Rakhine, 
Chin, Bamar, and Hindu people from other parts of the country. Upon repatriation, the 
returnee Rohingyas would be kept in dismal transit centers, or, as Human Right Watch 
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calls them, ‘internment camp/open-air prisons’. As long as Myanmar cannot provide a 
sustainable environment to ensure the safety, security, dignity and citizenship rights of the 
Rohingyas, the repatriation of the Rohingya refugees in Myanmar will remain uncertain 
(Beech & Nang, 2018; Ellis-Petersen & Rahman, 2019; Goldberg, 2018; Taniparti, 2019; 
Uddin, 2018).  
 
Meanwhile, to relieve the congestion in the disaster-prone mega camp areas in 
Cox’s Bazar, the Bangladesh government prepared to relocate 100,000 Rohingya refugees 
to the island of Bhasan Char (Figure 2). A Human Rights Watch reports revealed that this 
relocation proposal is not a sustainable solution for a host of reasons: “1) it is not 
sustainable for human habitation; 2) it could be seriously affected by rising sea levels and 
storm surges; 3) it likely would have very limited education and health services; 4) it would 
provide extremely limited opportunities for livelihoods or self-sufficiency; 5) it would 
unnecessarily isolate refugees; 6) the Bangladeshi government has made no commitment 
to allow refugees’ freedom of movement in and from Bhasan Char; 7) it is far from the 
Myanmar border, and 8) the refugees have not consented to move there” (Human Rights 









After August 25, 2017, a total of 708, 985 Rohingya individuals and 151,277 
households began arriving in Bangladesh, and by March 2020 total refugee population has 
reached 859,161. The demographic profile is comprised of 52% female and 48% male, 
with 54% children, and 4.3% of total individuals identified as having a special need 
(UNHCR, 2020). Although more than 50,000 shelters have been erected since the 
beginning of the crisis, over 75% of families have to share their shelters. With living space 
as low as 8 square meters per person, 93% of the population lives below the UNHCR 
emergency standard of 45 square meters per person. Over 23,000 people are at serious risk 
of landslides, living in 120 hectares of landslide-prone areas (United Nations, n.d.).  
 
A case where 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile 
for five consecutive years or more in a given host country is defined as a ‘protracted refugee 
situation’ by UNHCR. According to UNHCR, “the situation of Rohingya refugees from 
Myanmar in Bangladesh is classified as a protracted situation because the refugee 
population has exceeded 25,000 every year since 2006 although the vast majority of the 
current refugee population from Myanmar arrived there in 2017” (UNHCR, 2019). In light 
of other refugee crises elsewhere, it is evident that if the displacement period is over six-
months, the refugees are highly likely to be in exile for years. Thus it is high time 
Bangladesh starts developing sustainable long-term solutions for the Rohingya refugees. 
In order to develop such a sustainable solution, it is necessary to understand the current 
planning approaches used in the Rohingya refugee camps and the overarching rationalities 
that drive these strategies. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
The conception of refugee crises as essentially temporary phenomena has led to the 
perception of refugee camps as transient settlements (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000; Hailey, 
2009; Turner, 2016; Moore, 2017). However, research in planning and design has 
demonstrated the necessity of developing more sustainable solutions for refugee camps, 
both to foster the livability of refugee camps but also to mitigate challenges for host 
communities (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000; Martin, 2014; Moore, 2017; Dalal et al. 2018; 
Jahre et al. 2018). In this literature review, I analyze the politics around the exclusion of 
refugees and the conceptualization of impermanence of refugee camps, and the resultant 
governance structure and planning decisions in refugee camps. I focused primarily on 
literature that focuses on refugee issues; research that only examined IDP (Internally 
Displaced People) settlements was excluded. 
 
3.1. THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION AND IMPERMANENCE 
To understand how the conceptualization of impermanence has become a driving 
rationality behind refugee camp or settlement policies, we must first comprehend the 
meaning and social acceptance associated with the word ‘refugee’. According to the 
UNHCR report of 2019, around 68.5 million people are forcibly displaced from home 
worldwide and 25.4 million of them are refugees, the highest levels of displacement in 
record till now in the world. Two-thirds of all refugees come from just five countries: Syria, 
Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar, and Somalia. Eighty-five percent of displaced people 
worldwide are hosted by developing countries that struggle with resource limitations 
(UNHCR, 2019).  
 
 28 
UNHCR defines a refugee as “someone who has been forced to flee his or her 
country because of persecution, war, or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of 
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a 
particular social group” (USA for UNHCR, n.d.). The system of state and resource 
enclosures is deeply embedded in our culture and way of life and dominates our socio-
political discourse (Jones, 2016). When a refugee leaves his homeland to escape violence, 
persecution, and poverty, not only is he at constant risk but also seen as a threat to the 
economic, cultural, and political development of the host country. Thus, refugees are seen 
as a ‘matter out of place’ that should be secluded to protect ‘the national order of things’ 
(Malkki, 1992). Taking a cue from Ahmed and Garland, Zembylas (2010) argued that a 
politics of fear produced through power relations and cultural scripts constructs 
immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers as ‘fearsome’ threats to the host nation’s very 
existence.  
 
To understand how these ‘fearsome’ refugees and their positions in our social, 
political, and economic life are constructed and adjusted, the concept of ‘biopower,’ a term 
coined by Foucault and later expanded by Agamben may provide further insight. 
According to Foucault (1980, 2003, 2007), biopower is the mechanism through which 
corrective and disciplinary strategies (enforced within the state in the form of the prison, 
school, and hospital) are replaced by biopolitics who holds the power to regulate the life 
of the population. The state thus acts preventively to protect its populations’ well-being 
and does not hesitate to exclude people from other nations or harm them in this process 
(Zembylas, 2010).  This politics of security, which creates a distinct divide between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’, ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’- where the former has right to live and flourish and 
the latter gets expendable, based on the different kinds of profiling – race, ethnicity, 
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nationality and so on, can be understood through Foucault’s conception of ‘biopolitics’ 
(Zembylas, 2010). Expanding on Foucault’s work, Agamben (1998) argues that biopolitics 
is not only a phenomenon of modern politics but has been practiced in Western society 
since early Greek civilization when biopolitics was reflected in Aristotle’s idea of the 
separation between life in the ‘polis’ (the political life) and ‘Zoe’ (the biological life) or 
bare life. Agamben (2005) argues that biopolitics is embedded in a ‘structure of exception’, 
whereby the life of the citizen (his political and social life) is construed as at risk. That is 
to say, through the simultaneous exclusions and inclusions of bare life, biopower exerts its 
ability to ‘suspend itself in a state of exception and determine who lives and who dies’ 
(Zembylas, 2010). Through the power of biopolitics, the refugee camps became “the 
fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West… insofar as its inhabitants were stripped of 
every political status and wholly reduced to bare life, the camp was also the most absolute 
biopolitical space ever to have been realized, in which power confronts nothing but pure 
life, without any mediation” (Agamben 1998, p.171, 181). Drawing on Agamben (1998) 
and Owens (2009), Ramadan (2013) explains how refugee status thus gets constructed as 
a ‘temporary’ condition that can only lead to some form of normalization through achieving 
citizenship, either via naturalization or repatriation. Through their exclusion, refugees are 
“governed at the level of population in a permanent ‘state of exclusion’ outside the normal 




3.2. EXCEPTIONAL’ GOVERNANCE AND PRODUCTION OF ADHOCRACY 
Refugee camps hence appear as a means to contain the ‘matter out of place’—the 
refugee camp encompasses both the symptom and the cure (Turner, 2016). Taking a cue 
from Agier and Agamben, Turner (2016) explains how the realms of refugee camps can be 
delineated by extraterritoriality, exception, and exclusion. Camps are extraterritorial when 
they are placed in a secluded area, they fall under the realm of exception as they are 
governed by different legal instruments than their surroundings, and by restricting their 
integration into host culture and society, they are subjected to social exclusion (Turner, 
2016). However, in this space of exclusion emerges a ‘humanitarian space’ where the 
international community comes forward to consign a state of protection and relief for 
refugees in an ‘enduring but ultimately temporary way’ (Edkins, 2000; Elden, 2009; 
McQueen, 2005; Yamashita, 2004; Ramadan, 2013). The intersections of these two realms 
thus provide refugee camps a dual dimension of technology of ‘care and control’ (Malkki, 
1992).  
 
Given their duality, international aid agencies view refugee camps with skepticism. 
As UNHCR declares in their emergency handbook, “along with the wider humanitarian 
community, UNHCR does not advocate the creation of camps. It considers them to be 
temporary measures of last resort” (UNHCR, n.d., p.2). At the same time, the agency needs 
to secure authorization from representatives of the nation-state, and the role of camp 
administration is “usually assumed by national or local authorities. It involves the overall 
supervision of a camp response, including the security of the persons of concern” 
(UNHCR, n.d., p.2), who in most cases supports the exclusionary power structure of the 
refugee camp. Within this duality and among the presence of a diverse array of agencies – 
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national and international aid organizations, donors and governmental entities- rise a 
system of mismanagement which emerges in the form of a ‘chaotic and improvisational 
adhocracy’ (Dunn, 2016).  Although governance in refugee camps is ostensibly premised 
on “seeing, counting, and managing”, Dunn (2012) argues that it is more based on 
“guesswork, rules of thumb, and satisficing the needs of rational planning” (Dunn, 2012, 
p.2). Camp governance relies on ‘rough-and-ready’ ways of knowing to quickly work out 
improvised solutions, thus transforming bureaucracy into “adhocracy- a form of power that 
creates chaos and vulnerability as much as it creates order” (Dunn, 2012, p.2). Within this 
system, where everything is supposed to be temporary, transitional and where ‘aid’ and 
‘care’ are distributed on an ad-hoc basis, refugees are kept in suspension: they do not know 
what the future holds or how to plan for it, and they do not know how to leverage the 
resources and services available to them. They are “stranded in the present, left in a 
situation that is forever temporary” (Dunn, 2016, p. 773). 
 
3.3. POSSIBILITIES OF REFUGEE CAMP PLANNING IN ADHOCRACY  
The idea of refugee camps as spaces of exception, exclusion, and impermanence 
shapes the physical and spatial planning approaches to address the refugee crisis. Camps 
are built as temporary means to address a presumably ‘temporary’ refugee crisis, and, 
following the Agambenian principle of providing a bare life for refugees in camps, many 
host governments ban the use of permanent building materials like concrete or burnt bricks, 
instead of using temporary materials in order to reproduce a sense of impermanence in the 
built environment (Dunn, 2016). While refugees are supposed to live in a host country for 
only a limited amount of time, because of political disagreements refugees remain in their 
host country for 17 years on average, according to the UNHCR (Sabie, 2017). Since camps 
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typically have a longer lifespan than they are intended to, recent research views camps as 
long-term settlements rather than a temporary holding facility and examines the 
possibilities are transforming camps into cities (Kennedy, 2005, Jahre et al, 2018; Radford, 
2015). In most cases, however, host governments seek to limit any sense of permanency 
by locating transient settlements in environmentally hazardous and socially isolated places 
(Moore, 2017). According to Hailey (2009), host governments believe "camps are not 
intended to be sustainable settlements” (Hailey, 2009, p.325), instead exposing refugees to 
risky conditions which in turn leads them to become environmental refugees (Hailey, 2009; 
Corsellis and Vitale 2004). Thus, the privileging of impermanent solutions as a means of 
control may lead to a protracted or even worsening refugee situation. 
 
Recent research has explored new approaches to refugee camp planning from the 
perspective of urban planning, suggesting that the socio-political realities call for context-
responsive ways of durable spatial planning to provide adequate, dignified and sustainable 
measures for the development of refugee community (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000, Dalal 
et al. 2018, Jahre et al. 2018).  Other studies have sought to reimagine the traditional top-
down nature of the refugee camps, how to improve shelter conditions and design with 
refugees’ input in the design process, and the environmental implications of refugee camps 
(Ratnayake & Rameezdeen, 2008; Hagenlocher, Lang & Tiede, 2012; Ohlson and Melich, 
2014; Anderson, 2016; Dabaieh & Alwall, 2018). Spatial planning approaches that 
recognize refugee settlements as a 'node' connected to the social-political realm of adjacent 
territories can be a useful concept for both short term planning and subsequent future 




Another stream of literature has focused on how the operations and governance of 
aid organizations have transformed refugees from political to neoliberal subjects through 
the practice of 'resiliency humanitarianism', an approach that focuses on strategies of care, 
the exercise of knowledge expertise, and social and political practices which operate within 
and beyond refugee camps (Fassin, 2007; Agier, 2011; Gryzb, 2013; Ilcan, 2013). Within 
this paradigm of resiliency humanitarianism, neoliberal governance operates to “mobilize 
new forms of responsible subjects,” privileging partnerships among different actors as a 
cost-effective way to manage refugees. Such partnership will facilitate the “sharing of 
knowledge and capacities and capacity-building among partners,” fostering a “view of 
refugees as the objects and subjects of government, and the camp as an enduring living 
space or community” (Ilcan, 2009; Ilcan 2013; Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015, p.336,338). Such 
partnerships with refugees to operate and manage the camps, however, evades the notion 
of life in refugee camps as temporary and transitional (Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015).  
 
Following the notions of resiliency humanitarianism, other research has focused on 
the spatial dimension of camps and advocated for the integration of refugee community 
with the host community through the “interconnectedness between activities, actors and 
resources” (Adjahossou,2015;  Granovetter, 1985; Hakansson et. al, 2009; Jahre et. al, 
2018, p.326). Recent studies have also shown that operating within a resiliency 
humanitarianism paradigm, refugee camps can become engines of economic growth where 
resources and services are shared between host communities and refugees (Adjahossou, 
2015; Gibson, 2016, Jahre et al, 2018, Radford, 2015). Through this paradigm of resiliency 
humanitarianism, refugees are viewed as neoliberal residents of the camp who are resilient 
in nature and capable of participating in the governance of the day-to-day running of the 
camp, thus mitigating the feeling of disempowerment among refugees (Ilcan & Rygiel, 
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2015). However, the empowerment provided through this approach represents a 
depoliticization of the refugee crisis, and resiliency becomes a ‘methodology of power’ 
that encourages refugees to adapt to the prevailing system rather than demanding a 
structural change that ensures their needs and rights as both human beings and citizens 
(Welsh, 2014; Ilcan and Rygiel, 2015). Thus, Hilhorst (2018) concludes that the resilience 
paradigm “consists of a set of ill-tested assumptions that seem to reduce the multiplicity of 
social reality to a singular discourse” (Hilhorst, 2018, p.10).  
 
However, the Agambenian view and resiliency humanitarianism are not mutually 
exclusive. They both come into play and shape the planning and governance of a refugee 
camp in various degrees. Focusing on the Agambenian view of the refugee camp, most 
planning literature has examined the impact of political systems and external actor 
relationships on planning decisions in refugee camps. Less research has explored the 
human side of refugee camps, instead of viewing refugees as passive recipients of aid. 
However, refugee camps must be understood through the interactions of all of the actors 
that shape their spatial and social character, including national governments, aid agencies, 
host communities, and also the refugees themselves, whose side of the story—their struggle 
and adaptive mechanisms as well as their everyday politics—are often excluded. There is 
still a lack of research which focuses on the refugees as an actor in the planning field whose 
everyday practices shape the planning and management of the camps. Given the 
importance of the everyday practices of refugees to understanding the social and spatial 





Simone uses this concept to explain the everyday economic and political life of 
citizens in African cities, which is characterized by “the potential resourcefulness of 
relatively invisible architectures of sometimes highly dispersed collaboration among actors 
who may or may not know they are indeed collaborating” (Simone, 2008, p. 14). The idea 
of emergency democracy can also be read together with Simone’s conceptualization of 
‘people as infrastructure’.  Here he refers to forms of “economic collaboration among 
residents seemingly marginalized from and immiserated by urban life……the kinds of 
provision and articulation are viewed as making the city productive, reproducing it, and 
positioning its residents, territories, and resources in specific ensembles where the energies 
of individuals can be most efficiently deployed and accounted for” (Simone, 2004, p. 407).  
 
Though Simone developed these concepts to understand informal practices in 
African cities, I suggest these are also applicable to the situation in refugee camps where, 
despite restrictive planning mandates, the refugees do not limit themselves to their role as 
neoliberal, responsible citizens. Instead, they establish themselves as actors of emergency 
democracy who negotiate with other actors while developing networks of informal 
connections (Simone, 2004; Simone, 2008). Refugees thus develop a strong social 
infrastructure system in the camp, allowing them to exert influence on planning processes. 
Through their social infrastructures, they challenge the discourse of impermanence through 
“webs of interaction that open up new uses for ordinary objects and infrastructure, thus 
altering what they mean and what their value might be” (Simone, 2008, p.14).  
 
Through his study of the Palestinian refugee camps, Ramadan (2013) also argued 
that the refugee camp is much more than “a void of law and political life,” instead he 
viewed refugee camps as a production of the “relations between and the practices of people- 
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as individuals, families, institutions, and organizations” (Ramadan, 2013, p. 70). 
Examining the actors involved in shaping the geopolitical landscapes of camps but also 
those who live in this landscape, Ramadan (2012) argues that temporality is produced in 
camps through two registers: the external formal juridical–political order of states, 
international agencies and international law, and the internal cultural, social and political 
order of the camp-society. This internal order is not always manifested in the built 
environment, nor can it always be measured in terms of time. In some cases of the 
protracted refugee situation, camps lose their temporary character through host community 
and refugee interaction and informal integration, and the ‘campscape’ blurs with the 
adjacent city boundary, such as in the case of Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut (Martin, 
2015).  In other cases, the lack of integration with the host community prolongs the 
temporality of the refugee camps in every sense (Anderson, 2016). Since every refugee 
crisis is unique in nature and scale, context-based understanding of refugee camps, 
including the relationships among all the actors and their everyday practices, is necessary 
to outline prudent policy and planning solutions. 
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Chapter 4: Rohingya Refugee Camp 
4.1. THE CAMPSCAPE IN COX’S BAZAR 
Rohingya refugees are living in different settlements in two Upazilas3 - Ukhiya and 
Teknaf in Cox’s Bazar District in Bangladesh. The settlements are divided into 34 camp 
areas covering 9.83 square mile area in total. Most of the 26 camps are located in the 
Palongkhali union4 in Ukhiya. Two camps are designated as registered camps by the RRRC 
Office (Office of Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner) of Bangladesh —
Kutupalong (KTP) RC and Nayapara (NYP) RC—where Rohingya refugees who entered 
Bangladesh before the 2017 influx are living now. Whereas the refugee settlements in 
Ukhiya are restricted within distinct spatial camp boundaries, refugee settlements in Teknaf 
are not confined by a spatial boundary and are located in close proximity to host community 









3 Upazilas are the second lowest tier of regional administration in Bangladesh. They function as sub-units of 
“districts.” Bangladesh is divided into 8 Divisions, 64 Districts, 492 Upazilas (sub-districts). The Upazilas 
are further sub-divided into 4554 rural union councils and 323 town councils.  
4 Union councils or unions are the smallest rural administrative and local government units in Bangladesh. 
There are 4554 unions in Bangladesh. Each Union is made up of nine Wards. Usually one village is 
designated as a ward.  
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Around 1000 acres of forest were cleared and many hills leveled to build the 
refugee camps (Figure 4). The camps are situated alongside the Teknaf Wildlife Sanctuary 
and the camps in  Kutupalong and Ukhiya are built on a vital elephant migration path, 
making them vulnerable to frequent elephant attacks (Daly, 2018). Most of the camps are 
built on leveled hills, which make them vulnerable to different disasters including 
landslides and monsoon flooding, while a few of them are built without leveling hills, using 
building techniques that have lower environmental impacts. 







At first glance, the landscape of the Rohingya refugee camp is like a congested 
slum with impermanent shelters and little patches of green here and there. The temperature 
in the camp area was three degrees Celsius higher on average than in the nearby suburban 
area during the dry season in April 2019, and dust from the dry clays in the hills made it 
difficult to breathe (Burak, pers. int., 2019). When I visited the refugee camp in June, it 
was raining for the first time after a long dry summer season. While the temperature was 
comfortable, refugees were busy protecting their shelters from the inclement weather.  
 
I found different types of shelters in different camps during my site visit in July 
2019. At the beginning of the emergency period, UNHCR provided some Refugee Housing 
Units (RHU) (Figure 5) to the camps. RHU units are modular, foldable shelter units with 
lightweight steel frames and semi-hard and opaque plastic panels as roofs and walls. 
Although this unit has proved to be a successful emergency shelter unit in refugee 
settlements in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, the envelope material is not suitable 
for the subtropical monsoon climate in Bangladesh. The internal temperature of the RHU 
units is higher than the outdoor temperature, making them uncomfortable for housing. In 




Figure 5: RHU Units provided by UNHCR, source: Author. 
When the refugees first came to Bangladesh in 2017, UNHCR and IOM gave each 
household a material kit that included 6-8 bamboo poles, tarpaulin, and ropes. Each 
household was given the same amount of materials irrespective of the household size and 
was expected to build their shelters themselves. Since people were arriving by the 
thousands every day, it was not possible for aid organizations to build shelters for the 
refugees. By the time the influx of refugees has abated, monsoon season arrived and the 
makeshift shelters built by refugees became vulnerable. Faced with the need for more 
durable shelters, aid organizations started planning shelters that met the international 
standard of minimum shelter requirements: at least 2m tall shelters with 3.5 square meters 




bamboo, concrete and metal footing, additional poling and ropes—and refugees were 
provided with training to make these so-called ‘midterm’ shelters more durable. By this 
time, the camp had been expanded and also become very densely populated, making it 
difficult to reach every household to distribute these materials. Since there was not enough 
space to rebuild every shelter according to international standards, the midterm shelters 
were restricted to the most newly developed area of the camp (Manita, pers. int., 2019). As 
a result, in the camps there is a mixture of shelters available, some still in the form of 
emergency shelters while others are midterm. 
 
The shelters are often divided into two spaces, one for living and one for a kitchen. 
In the initial phase of the settlement, refugees cut trees from surrounding hills to use as 
fuel. Later each household was given a stove, and each month they receive a cylinder of 
LPG gas to use as fuel. Other infrastructure services, such as toilets and hand pumps to 
obtain drinking water, are housed in a communal location. In some camps, 15-20 
households have to share a toilet, bathing space, and a hand pump.  
 
In the extended camp areas, UNHCR and IOM have started building two camps: 
Camp 4 Extension and Camp 20 Extension. Unlike the early emergency camps, the site 
planning for these camps was completed before construction, and the camps are built 
following the international standards outlined in the Sphere Handbook and the UNHCR 
Camp Planning Standard. The top of the hills have been flattened to build those camps, 
and refugees are allowed to build the shelters by themselves far enough apart to allow for 
minimum ventilation. The shelter size is usually 10 ft by 15 ft. In these midterm shelters, 
the construction technique and materials are better than in the impromptu ones, and 
stronger building materials like bamboo are used to stabilize the roof. Refugees are also 
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trained on how to build resilient shelters with the impermanent materials available to them. 
In these newer camps, every four households share a toilet and a bathing space, and there 
is room around their shelters to grow vegetables. These camps are also provided with waste 
disposal bins and firefighting equipment. Because of the more ample open spaces between 
the shelters, if all the camps were built this way, the total refugee settlement area would be 
four times bigger than the present area.  
  
In contrast to the camps in the Ukhiya area, the camps in Teknaf are located close 
to the host communities. The architecture in those camps is similar to the host community, 
and it is difficult to distinguish refugee settlements from the host communities as the spatial 
boundaries between them are often blurred. One of these is Camp 21, locally known as 
Omani Camp because it is funded by the Sultanate of Oman. The local host community 
builds their houses on stilts and the refugee shelters are also built that way (Figure 6). These 
stilt structures allow shelters to be built without leveling hilly areas, leading to less 
environmental destruction than in the case of Ukhiya. In Omani Camp, infrastructure 
services such as toilets, bathing spaces, and drinking water are communal, with about 6-7 




Figure 6: (top) Integrated refugee settlements with the host community at Omani camp, 





While the shelter types vary among different camps, the different infrastructural 
systems—roads, bridges, drainage structures, and waste management systems—are 
relatively similar. Apart from the main roads, all other secondary and tertiary roads are 
built of mud and sand. Thus during monsoon season, they become slippery and at times 
unusable. The main roads that connect the refugee camp area with the host communities 
are paved with bricks instead of asphalt, which is typically used in Bangladesh.  As a result, 
during monsoon season, these brick roads also become risky and require reconstruction 
several times. The central drainage and sewer system are of concrete material in some 
cases, but all the sewer systems in individual shelters are constructed with bamboo, ropes, 
and bags of sand/cement, and the bridges across the canals connecting different camps are 
also made of bamboo. Building sewer and drainage systems with permanent materials like 
concrete and brick would limit the possibility of preplanning the whole camp (Manita, pers. 
int., 2019). Other than in the newly designed Camp 4 Extension and Camp 20 Extension, 
no camps have a central sewer system. The toilets are pit latrines with bamboo fences or 
corrugated sheets as envelopes, and the fecal sludge is removed from the pit and brought 
to the treatment plant through a mobile transportation system using ‘vacuum trucks’.  
Wastewater from the kitchen and bathing spaces flows to the main drainage. In a few 
camps, including the registered camp and the newly designed Camps 4 and 20, there are 
dustbins of different colors to dispose of organic and inorganic wastes, but those are not 
enough in number and are not properly utilized. In other camps, there are landfill areas 
where refugees dump their household waste. 
 
The communal structures stand out in the camp landscape (Figure 7.1-7.4). These 
include learning centers, child-friendly spaces, women-friendly spaces, community spaces, 
mosques, madrassas, and roadside small tea shops, but the number, size, and shape of 
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different communal structures vary from camp to camp. While the shelters in the refugee 
camps are impermanent in nature, these communal structures are more of a semi-permanent 
character. Uses of bricks and concrete as building materials are allowed to a certain extent 
in those structures. Other built structures in the camp include hospitals, health camps, site 
management office, military base structure, structures for elephant watch, and storage 










Figure 7.1- 7.4: (top to bottom) A mosque, a Learning Center, a tea stall, a Women 
Friendly Space, source: Author. 
 
 48 
4.2. THE PLANNED CAMP IN BHASAN CHAR  
To tackle the congestion issue in Cox's Bazar, the Government of Bangladesh has 
spent $280 million to relocate 100,000 refugees to an island named Bhasan Char (Figure 
8). It is an isolated island far from the mainland, and there is a debate going on whether 
this island is inhabitable or not. The entire island is supposed to be encircled by a 30-mile 
long and 20-foot high embankment as a flood defense mechanism. Although this initiative 
is also termed a ‘temporary arrangement’ (Paul, Baldwin & Marshall, 2018), the built 
landscape there is completely different from that of Cox’s Bazar. The shelters are made of 
hollow bricks and corrugated metal and are standing on three feet high pylons to protect 
against flooding in the monsoon season. Each shelter cluster consists of 16 living units (12 
ft X 14 ft) to house 16 families and includes a shared kitchen, toilets, and bathing facilities 
at two ends. The shelters are clustered around a central pond or field, and each cluster has 
a 4-story communal structure that will be used as a hospital, community center, school, or 
cyclone shelter (Figure 9).  In this arrangement, every refugee will have an average of 3.6 
square meters of living area, which meets the UNHCR’s emergency minimum standard 
(Reuters Graphics, 2017). Two-thirds of the island has been preserved in its natural state, 








Figure 8: (top) Satellite image of Bhasan Char in April 2020, source: Google Earth; 




Figure 9: Construction detail of Bhasan Char Project, source: Mukta Dinwiddlie 
Maclaren Architects. 
 
4.3. THE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
The response to the Rohingya refugee crisis can be analyzed on three levels: 
national (Dhaka-based), local/district (Cox’s Bazar district base), and camp level. On the 
national level, the Government of Bangladesh established a National Strategy on Myanmar 
Refugees and Undocumented Myanmar Nationals in 2013, followed by a National Task 





Bangladesh also established the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner (RRRC)’s 
Office in 1992 under the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MoDMR) to 
oversee the relief and repatriation initiatives for Rohingya refugees who fled from 
Myanmar to Bangladesh in the years 1991-1992 to escape political, social, economic and 
ethnic persecution. RRRC is the topmost decisive authority in Bangladesh, tasked with 
operationalizing the coordination of the refugee response at the District level. 
 
To assist the Government of Bangladesh in responding effectively to the Rohingya 
refugee crisis, the Strategic Executive Group (SEG), co-chaired by the UN resident 
coordinator, UNHCR and IOM, coordinates the work of humanitarian organizations on the 
national level. At the district level, coordination is provided by the Inter-Sector 
Coordination Group (ISCG) Secretariat, which incorporates representatives of 
humanitarian organizations, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) along with various agencies, 
NGOs, and sectoral technical groups. In terms of the international response, UNHCR and 
IOM administer nearly half of the refugee population and manage camps based on a 
geographic division of responsibility. To facilitate this large scale refugee camp 
management, partnerships among local, national, international agencies are seen as a ‘cost-
effective way’, whereby knowledge and capacities of partners are shared to manage the 
operations of the refugee camp and serve the refugees properly (Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015). 
 
To better coordinate these partnerships and to improve humanitarian response 
capacity, in 2005 UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs) introduced several approaches “to enhance predictability, accountability, and 
partnerships” (UNHCR, n.d.:2) One of these new elements is the 'Cluster' approach (Figure 
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10). “Clusters are groups of humanitarian organizations, both UN and non-UN, in each of 
the main sectors of humanitarian action, e.g. water, health, and logistics. They are 
designated by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and have clear responsibilities 
for coordination” (Humanitarian Response, n.d.). Based on the UNOCHA led 'cluster' 
system, IOM, with the assistance of DFID (Department of International Development), 
designed a sector-based coordination process. The sectors include: i) Protection (with two 
specialized sub-sectors – Gender-Based Violence (GBV), Child Protection (CP)), ii) Food 
Security, iii) Education, iv) Site Management and Site Development (SMSD), v)Health, 
vi) Nutrition, vii) Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), viii) Shelter and Non-Food 
Items (NFI), ix) Communication with Communities (CwC), x) Logistics, xi) Emergency 
Telecommunication, and xii) Coordination. Under the leadership of the Government of 
Bangladesh and in collaboration with related ministries, each sector assesses the needs and 
funding requirements and outlines appropriate response strategies for the affected 
population (here the affected include both the refugees and the host community population 
affected by the crisis), which culminates in a Joint Response Plan (JRP).  
 
At the camp level, a government official from the RRRC office is appointed as a 
Camp-In-Charge (CIC). Every decision regarding camp management and planning must 
be approved by the CIC, in some cases followed by an initial approval of RRRC. Each 
sector partners with different local and international NGOs that implement the goals and 
objectives at the camp level. Figure 11 shows the camp areas managed by UNHCR and the 
sectoral distribution of responsibilities among different partner NGOs. These partner 
organizations and their workers interact with the refugees directly. In the refugee 
community at the camp level, there is also a hierarchy. Each camp area is divided into 
blocks; in cases, these blocks are divided into sub-blocks. The refugees in each camp area 
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select a representative who they refer to as 'Majhi', and representatives are also chosen at 
the block and sub-block level. These representatives serve as liaisons between refugees and 
NGOs and work jointly to distribute resources in the camps. Volunteer refugee groups, 
including both male and female members, also work with partner NGOs to help gauge the 
needs and capacities of the refugees and to implement field-level goals and objectives of 
different sectors.  










4.4. HOST COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVE AND PLANNING 
Context and Demographics 
According to UNHCR, since August 2017, over 742,000 Rohingya refugees have 
fled Myanmar to take shelter mainly in Cox’s Bazar District. With this recent influx, the 
total number of Rohingya refugees in those areas has surpassed the local population by two 
to one, making Cox’s Bazar the site of “the densest concentration of refugees in the world” 
(OCHA, 2017). Cox’s Bazar is one of the 20 (out of 64) ‘lagging districts’ of Bangladesh 
while Ukhiya and Teknaf are among the 50 most socially deprived Upazilas (out of 492). 
The frequent cyclones, difficult hilly topography, insufficient and weak infrastructural 
system along with lack of cultivable land for own food production contribute to the poor 
living condition in the camps (ACAPS-NPM-Analysis Hub, 2018).  
 
A multi-sector needs analysis done by ISCG to gauge the needs of communities in 
the Ukhiya and Teknaf region reveals that, while three-fifths of the individual in the host 
community have completed primary education, a significantly lower population have 
completed secondary education. Because of a lack of cultivable land, the most common 
source of income is skilled labor and small businesses. The great influx of refugees as 
cheap labor has limited local employment opportunities, with 39% of local households 
reporting that their economic status had deteriorated and 79% of households reporting an 
increase in the cost of living. Lack of cultivable land also contributes to the dependence of 





Most shelter types in the host communities in Ukhiya and Teknaf are classified as 
‘kutcha’ (temporary, made of mud, bamboo, wood and corrugated iron sheets as the roof) 
and ‘semi-pucca’ (semi-permanent,  with walls partially made of bricks, floors made from 
cement, corrugated iron sheets as roofs). There is still a great reliance on locally collected 
firewood as cooking fuel in the host community. Although the camps are situated in a 
cyclone zone and are prone to flooding and mudslides, very few households have received 
training on how to make their shelters disaster resilient. Households also reported issues 
with environmental sanitation including the lack of waste management facilities and poor 
drainage and sewer systems, and the poor road network limits access to other life 
opportunities like better school, jobs, and health facilities (ISCG, 2019). 
 
Local perspectives on Rohingya refugees and their impact on planning 
When Rohingya refugees arrived in Bangladesh in August 2017, local residents 
were compassionate and welcomed them because of similarities in religion, language, and 
culture (ACAPS-NPM-Analysis Hub, 2018). However, when refugees outnumbered the 
number of inhabitants in the local host community, residents started feeling neglected. The 
arrival of international aid workers in the area led to food insecurity and increases in the 
cost of living, making it difficult for low-income and moderate-income households to enter 
the housing market. In areas where refugees and host communities live close together, 
landowners rent their property either to refugees or to NGOs for use, providing further 
benefits to affluent members of the host community. 
 
However, local residents also feel that the arrival of refugees has brought positive 
impacts. Residents with only secondary school degrees are able to obtain employment as 
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NGO workers with a dignified salary in the camps. These local NGO workers interact with 
refugees on a daily basis, becoming the de facto representatives of national refugee 
administration while also gaining a more intimate understanding of conditions in the 
camps. Although they believe that among Rohingya refugees many people are honest and 
hardworking, they also find that years of experience of living with conflict have made them 
ferocious. NGO workers agree that the camps need more durable planning solutions, but 
at the same time, they feel that this would encourage them to stay in Bangladesh instead of 
going back Myanmar, making them a burden on local resources: 
I agree with the government to some extent. Refugees are put in discomfort every 
day continuously. UN agency is also willing to keep them here and leave the 
place. The situation here came down to emergency level 3 from 4 last year. 
Whenever it would reach emergency level 1, no foreign expert would be here. 
They all would go back. They would give a little fund and national experts would 
continue working here.  (Abbas, pers. int., 2019).  
 
As more days pass by and repatriation attempts prove futile, the local host 
community started thinking that they might get displaced to accommodate the growing 
number of refugees. "As a part of the host community, I don't now think Ukhiya and Teknaf 
as part of Bangladesh. It is already encroached by refugee people. They are the majority 
here now” (Imran, pers.int., 2019). As refugees do not have enough options to earn money, 
some refugee men have become connected with drug trafficking, and others are accused of 
being involved in sex trafficking. I attended a seminar on the refugee crisis in Chittagong 
during my field research period, and most presenters blamed Rohingya refugees for the 
rising crime levels in Ukhiya and Teknaf districts. Only two researchers claimed that 
refugees are not the source but rather the victims of different crimes.   
On occasion, NGOs have abandoned the planning process because of local 
opposition and attempts to undermine their work: 
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So, we finished design one day and went to the site the next day, instead they 
found a pond there. People cut a pond overnight because they didn't want to give 
that land to refugees. Top officers from the government side also visited the site, 
people there said, we would rather give our lives than giving up on this land 
(Burak, pers. int., 2019).  
 
In some places, especially where local people and refugees living near each other, 
the environment is less hostile. Here, any development intended for refugees benefits the 
host community as well, giving them the sense they are looking out for each other. An 
NGO worker, Imran, explained his experience working in such a context:  
Refugees took shelter in local Bengali people's houses. They paid money or 
portion of their rations in return. They need each other for survival. An old lady 
has some property in the area which has minimum land value. She had no 
earnings form this land before. But now she is renting the land to10 Rohingya 
families and they are paying her money or portion of their ration for that. So, they 
have deep interdependency on each other. I have seen the host community in 
Teknaf getting benefitted from the presence of Rohingyas. At first, when I had to 
work with both communities, I saw that people from the host community are 
thinking about the benefits and wellbeing of the refugee community. At first, I 
didn't understand their reason. Later I realized they have mutual benefits and that's 
why they are interested in the wellbeing of each other (Imran, pers. int., 2019). 
 
In different focus groups hosted by NGOs, local people have expressed 
disappointment with the lack of investment by NGOs and aid organizations, leading donor 
organizations like the World Bank (WB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) to pursue 
initiatives to develop the infrastructure in host communities. However, as the needs of host 
communities are diverse and dependent on local contexts, such investment requires 
thorough needs assessments to be successful. Also, materials provided to refugees cannot 
be offered to host communities, as this would be ‘disgraceful’ and offensive to them 
(Manita, pers. int., 2019). Thus, in-depth communication with the host community through 
focus group discussions is necessary to gauge their needs.  
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Chapter 5: Emergence of Impermanence and Adhocracy 
From the emergency of the early refugee crisis to the protracted refugee situation, 
how refugee camps should be planned, designed, and maintained is still an unsettled issue. 
Different (f)actors play critical roles in determining the planning paradigms of refugee 
camps. In the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh, planning authorities have to deal 
with several concerns and conflicts at different levels every day, and those confrontations 
shape the sense of transience in the refugee camp. 
5.1. POLITICAL REALITY AND THE HOST GOVERNMENT POLICY 
From the beginning of the refugee crisis, the government of Bangladesh saw it as a 
short-term challenge, taking measures with a goal of ultimate repatriation of the Rohingya 
refugees to Myanmar and thus averting the prospects of long term multi-year planning 
(International Crisis Group, 2019). Although the Rohingya refugees are eager to go back 
to Myanmar, the reluctance of the Myanmar government to ensure the security of the 
Rohingyas and to restore their citizenship rights has resulted in two failed repatriation 
processes, without a single Rohingya refugee going back in Myanmar. The lack of effort 
and commitment by the Myanmar government to take back the Rohingya refugees suggests 
that the large-scale return of Rohingya refugees will not happen anytime soon. Bangladeshi 
officials believe that the country will be hosting the Rohingya refugees for a long time 
(International Crisis Group, 2019). 
 
According to a report by the International Crisis Group (2019), although the 
government of Bangladesh is well aware of the prospective protracted Rohingya refugee 
situation, officials are reluctant to engage in long-term planning for Rohingya refugees for 
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several reasons. Any visible long-term planning approach would encourage the Myanmar 
government to delay the repatriation process, and also would give a reason to international 
partners to avoid taking the necessary steps towards repatriation. This, in turn, would 
demoralize the Rohingya refugees and might encourage them to engage in different 
criminal activities to provide for themselves, or to turn to hostilities to force political 
change. Long-term refugee camp planning would also encourage the remaining Rohingyas 
in Myanmar to flee into Bangladesh and lead to local unrest, as people in host communities 
in Cox’s Bazar see the Rohingya refugees as “both a drain on the local economy and a 
source of insecurity” (International Crisis Group, 2019, p. 10).  
 
This political reality has led the government of Bangladesh to restrict the use of 
permanent materials in the Rohingya refugee camps. By providing the refugees with a 
sense of impermanence and exclusion, by making them struggle to obtain necessities of 
life, and by keeping them largely dependent on external aid, a constant tension is 
maintained in the refugee camp. Abraham, an NGO worker who has worked in the refugee 
camps for about one and a half years, explained how the political reality is shaping this 
sense of transience:  
Last year, the government used to say, we would take care of the refugees. But 
this year already they have changed their tone. Now they are saying it is not 
possible for us to handle this crisis alone. They are creating pressure on UN 
organizations by saying they have to take care of the refugees. The government 
doesn't provide livelihood opportunities for these refugees, as their tendency to 
stay here would increase. Myanmar would also not show interest in taking them 
back (Abraham, pers. int., 2019). 
Bravin, an architect working with a local NGO, also added, 
The government of Bangladesh doesn't want the refugees to even plant trees there. 
They fear that then refugees would not go from this country. They want refugees 




In this way, an unsustainable built environment premised on impermanence is produced, 
with an aim to prevent the refugees from having a sense of belonging to the place they now 
live.   
 
Another measure that the Government of Bangladesh has taken to reduce the rising 
congestion in the current camp area is relocating 100,000 Rohingya refugees to a distant 
island called Bhasan Char. Both international aid organizations and Rohingya refugees 
have expressed concerns about this relocation, as the island is vulnerable to frequent 
flooding and landslides and is isolated from the mainland. The Government of Bangladesh 
has been labeling this as a ‘temporary arrangement’ (Paul, Baldwin & Marshall, 2018). In 
this ‘temporary’ domain, the refugees would be provided with durable shelters made of 
hollow bricks and corrugated sheets, livelihood opportunities through agriculture and 
fishing, better services, and security. Although both the original camps in Cox’s Bazar and 
the new camps in Bhasan Char are termed ‘temporary’, the built environments lie at the 
opposite end of the spectrum (Figure 12). The geographically isolated location of Bhasan 
Char serves the aim of keeping refugees in a ‘state of exclusion,’ and therefore the built 




Figure 12: (top) Typical view of Bhasan Char Project, source: Mukta Dinwiddlie 
Maclaren Architects ; (bottom) typical view of Rohingya refugee camp in 






5.2. HUMANITARIAN AGENCY AND NGO CAPACITY 
Abigail, originally from Russia and now working as a coordinator for ICSG, 
highlighted the policy of humanitarian organizations regarding carrying out their duty in 
the refugee camps:  
 Nobody wants to be a refugee, nobody wants to be a migrant with having 
no chance to return. So I think that our goal should be providing them with at 
least minimum dignity, at least minimum human decency so they can stay until its 
safe. And when it is safe it is our job to help them go back but it is not our job to 
force them to go back. Because we have to bear the accountability to them if 
something happens, it has to be a fair and informed decision. That’s really 
important. Until then, it is our human responsibility, to provide them the 
minimum decency (Abigail, pers. int., 2019).  
 
About 145 NGO and humanitarian aid agencies with thousands of staff work in the 
Rohingya refugee camps to bring order and provide the refugees with a sense of dignity 
and security. Although they are staffed with international and national personnel who bring 
diversified knowledge and experience through a myriad of creative partnerships in the 
field, humanitarian aid agencies and implementing NGOs confront many obstacles to 
achieving their goals in the field.   
 
Funding challenges 
With strategic objectives of delivering protection, providing life-saving assistance, 
and fostering social cohesion, the 2019 Joint Response Plan for Rohingya Humanitarian 
Crisis provided an estimated USD 920 million to serve the population affected by the 
Rohingya refugee crisis. The affected population includes 911,000 refugees along with 
336,000 people from host communities. As of December 31, 2019, the amount of funding 
provided had reached USD 636 million, covering 69% of overall needs (Strategic 
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Executive Group, 2019). With the exception of food security, education, and emergency 
telecommunications sectors, nine of the 12 management sectors received less than 50% of 
their estimated need (Figure 13). These funding constraints severely impact the form and 
shape of the built environment. About the use of impermanent materials in the shelter and 
infrastructure, Abigail added that,  
Partially it is because of the funding, at the moment if we look at the midterm 
shelter, its’ around $1000 per shelter. If you look around transitional shelter 
assistance it’s around $250- $300 per shelter. So if you multiply that by 
280,000…..it’s a lot for us to provide (Abigail, pers. int., 2019).  
Thus, due to funding constraints in each sector, the provided services barely meet minimum 
requirements, and sometimes fall below.  
  
Also, the source of funding and its distribution is disparate and poorly coordinated. 
UNHCR and IOM collect funds from different donors and agencies and distribute them 
among the sectors as needed, working through different partner NGOs who are involved 
in the field directly. Sometimes these NGOs also receive funds from other donor agencies, 
and NGOs may disburse funds to other NGOs working in other sectors. Depending on the 
funds available to sectors and hence to implementing NGOs, the cost of the same type of 
project varies depending on the context, location, funding source, and agenda of the NGO 
and the donor. Before joining the team as an architect, Noah worked for a local NGO as a 
videographer and documented the lost childhood of Rohingya children in the refugee 
camps. Noah added,  
They used these documentaries to collect funds from donors. I suggested the 
NGO to increase the budget for individual learning centers that I would design. 
But they said that it is their funding agenda- a low-budget school. That is what 
attracts donors, they think, oh, I have to pay only this much money, then the 
refugee children can get a school. So the NGO tried to do everything within a low 
budget….. For every structure, we had a budget of USD 2500. Every expenditure 
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was included in this amount including my fee. So I had to keep in mind that I 
can't do much…… I once suggested developing a cost-effective durable structure 
taking the help of my students from the architecture department where I teach, but 
the NGO could not manage funds to support that activity (Noah, pers.int., 2019). 
 
Leah, who is working in another NGO that mainly designs and develops child-friendly 
spaces in the camps and host communities, expanded on her experience,  
The coverage area of our NGO is the whole camp area and the affected host 
community area. So if we want to reach each camp, the cost of constructing each 
center becomes USD 355, we used bamboo and tarpaulin as materials then. Later 
to make the shelter infrastructure more durable and resilient, we started small 
interventions like to use bamboo lattice as walls, corrugated sheets up to sill 
height for protection from rain and water, using cross bracings in the corner to 
make the shelter weather-resistant, etc. and now our budget is USD 800…the cost 
of materials in the camp area is also higher, and infrastructure cost is one portion 
of the center cost, we also have to buy artboards, toys and learning tools for 
children. So if the infrastructure cost becomes higher, the whole model gets a bit 
expensive (Leah, pers. int., 2019).  
 
Because of the poor coordination, some NGOs suffer from a lack of funding while 
other NGOs cannot utilize the funding properly because of the donor’s unrealistic criteria 
and lack of understanding of the camp context. Burak confronted these challenges several 
times, saying: 
When the humanitarian agency funds any project, they know what we have to 
face in the camp- they have an idea of how long a project can take time to 
implement. But most of the cases we get funding from other development 
agencies who do not work at the field level, they put a superficial idea, superficial 
need and timeline for a project, like I have to spend such amount of money to 
build such amount of learning centers in the one-month timeframe- things get 
very difficult to implement, then we put quantity over quality- just finish all the 




According to the World Bank, both the humanitarian and development challenges 
can be best confronted through partnerships between development agencies and 
humanitarian actors. However, rigid goal setting and outcome definition sometimes stand 
in the way for effective collaboration. Funding constraints, inefficient spending of funding, 
external pressures, and impractical expectations to reach quantifiable outcomes lead to an 
adhocratic management system. This adhocracy, in turn, leads to the creation of 
impermanent infrastructure systems that are shaped by the funding available per square 






Figure 13: 2019 JRP funding update, source: ISCG 
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Limited technical capacity 
One of the constraints that limit the scope of resilient and sustainable planning of 
the refugee camp areas is the limited technical capacity in terms of design, planning, and 
construction. Abigail explained that “one of the constraints is the limited capacity to plan. 
So, we need a lot of site planners to execute the plan, because it is a huge area and a very 
complex area…it is constantly changing” (Abigail, pers. int., 2019). Considering the large 
size of the campsite, the aid agencies and NGOs employ very few technical personnel with 
architecture, planning, and design knowledge, making it difficult to design and execute 
macro-level site planning. Due to funding constraints, the personnel cuts are getting more 
severe every year. Abraham, who works as a site development officer in a refugee camp, 
added that “the funding amounts are decreasing day by day. Last year, we had 3 engineers 
working in the camp, we had 1300 Rohingya volunteers. We could do massive tasks with 
this workforce. But this year we can only accommodate 250-300 volunteers. We don't have 
enough money to support a huge workforce like before” (Abraham, pers. int., 2019). 
 
The lack of technical competency also limits any necessary site modeling and 
evaluation. Each camp area is unique in terms of climate, terrain, and topsoil quality, 
making it difficult for planners to accurately model and evaluate hazard risks. Selena is 
working as an urban planner with the site development and management team in ISCG and 
explained that,  
The whole camp area has a flood hazard management plan and landslide 
management plan. But the thing with these analyses are they are done in a 
10mX10m pixel. Most of them are done from images or digital elevation level. 
These are not site-specific and have some level of inaccuracy. So we are thinking 
of making different types of planning proposals. Suppose you are in a flood-prone 
zone. Your zone might be designated as critically vulnerable and building any 
type of structure is prohibited, or you might be in a zone where there is a flood 
hazard but you need to follow some protocols or rules for flood mitigation and 
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you might need to do site analysis verification before building anything. But as 
there is inaccuracy in the initial simulation, it is difficult to evaluate accurately 
and decide. Variation of scale causes inaccuracy in the determination of flood risk 
at various levels (Selena, pers. int., 2019).  
 
Because of varying donor specifications and NGO capacities, infrastructural efficiency 
varies from one camp to another. Abraham, who has experience working in several camps, 
explained that,  
UNICEF has better expertise in WASH, health, and child protection shelters. The 
camps which are managed by UNICEF, they have these facilities and they are in 
good condition rather than camps funded by other authorities (Abraham, pers. int., 
2019).  
 
Along with a lack of personnel with technical know-how in design and planning, 
there is also a scarcity of skilled workers in the camps. Rohingya refugee men work as day 
laborers at very low wages (usually BDT 300, USD 3.5 a day) on construction projects in 
the camp, but they are skilled with bamboo construction, not building methods using brick 
and concrete. Because of this availability of cheap labor with construction skills in bamboo 
and woodwork, NGOs and aid agencies chose bamboo as the primary construction material 
in Rohingya refugee camps. Noah explained that  
All the construction workers were Rohingya. So, I had to keep in mind what they 
can do and what is difficult for them. They don't know the use of brick in 
construction but they had good expertise on bamboo. They could do a lot of 
things with bamboo. So, we prioritized that as our building material (Noah, pers. 
int., 2019).  
 
To relieve congestion and accommodate the growing refugee population, the 
shelter sector has designed a two-story bamboo structure with steel reinforcements. 
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However, officials working in the sector believe they will need to go through an extensive 
capacity-building process before these structures are built. Abigail added that,  
The thing about the two-story shelter is that it needs to be built. When it becomes 
two-story the process gets complicated. So, we are looking for methods on how to 
train people to build those structures themselves (Abigail, pers. int., 2019).  
 
Thus, the lack of technical skills among the people who actually translate plans into reality 
contributes to the impermanency of Rohingya refugee camps.  
 
Administrative complications 
Clashes between political interests and humanitarian policies often hinder planning 
efforts aiming for sustainable, refugee needs-based development, and serve to reproduce 
the adhocratic governance system prevailing in the camps. Abigail, who works in the 
shelter sector, explained the dilemma they face on a daily basis working in the Rohingya 
refugee camp: 
It is very difficult to have a common agreement and common understanding. So, 
you know for us it is very important to follow certain standards…..like we need at 
least 6 ft between shelters so we could have light, we could have ventilation, 
people can walk. At the same time, the govt says, no, this is too much. You are 
taking too much space. So how do we find the balance? How do we balance 
between that? (Abigail, pers. int., 2019).  
 
The diverse arrays of national and international aid organizations, NGOs, donors, and 
government entities have given rise to a management system that is political, chaotic, and 
unable to properly accommodate the needs of the refugees. While sharing his experience 




We have a guideline for emergency shelters. The shelter sector prepared that 
guideline and provided it to us. It is not a very practical one. They made this strict 
guideline based on refugee numbers. According to that guideline, I cannot give a 
refugee a new shelter until his previous one is completely damaged. I cannot serve 
the refugee people properly if I completely follow that guideline (Abraham, pers. 
int., 2019).  
 
Abdal, who has been working with an NGO that has the most extensive network in the 
camps, explained that planning efforts are futile because of the morass of bureaucracy and 
red tape:  
There are so many layers of authorization you have to pass to do work. It 
sometimes becomes difficult for big organization itself to pass those layers. 
Sometimes it is seen that the budget for your project is approved, design of the 
project is ready, but govt says, no, we cannot let that project build here. 
Everything goes in vain. The whole project becomes obsolete (Abdal, pers.int., 
2019).  
 
Thus, the distribution of ‘aid’ and ‘care’ for refugees gets trapped in the adhocratic system, 
depriving refugees of services and resources and excluding them from the ‘normal’ legal 
framework.  
 
5.3. LACK OF COORDINATION AMONG AGENCIES 
The idea of partnerships among different agencies and aid organizations in the 
humanitarian landscape emerged as a strategy to “shift existing unequal power relations 
between donor and recipient, improving program sustainability through increased 
efficiency and achieving common project goals and interests” (Abrahamsen, 2004; Noxolo, 
2006; Kunz, 2013; Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015:338). However, these partnerships also entail 
drawbacks if not executed in a cohesive manner. In the Rohingya refugee camps, NGOs 
operate in a hierarchical system and lack of coordination among agencies often results in 
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planning interventions that accentuate the notion of impermanence in the built 
environment.  
  
In the Rohingya refugee camps, at the sector level, coordination among different 
sectors plays a crucial role as several sectors have identical goals, objectives, and recipient 
populations. Cohesive coordination efforts could make the delivery of services appropriate, 
context-responsive, efficient in terms of space and expenses, and reduce the impact of the 
‘adhocratic’ management system prevailing in the camps. For example, Selena explained 
that  
Every sector knows which camp needs what facility more. The sector has the full 
picture. So without any coordination, it is difficult to understand the need of the 
community. This is happening in the camps- some camps lack many facilities 
whether some camps have those facilities in abundance. Intra-sectoral 
coordination is also needed. Like CFS and education do something together by 
merging their programs. Because we lack space comparing to the facility we need 
here. So, intra-sectoral coordination can make proper utilization of space. So 
when a partner organization does things without coordinating with sectors, there 
is a possibility that we might get dispersed facilities in different camps but 
effective management and proper utilization of the space are not ensured. It is also 
important to maintain effective communication and coordination when any plans 
transfer from sector level to camp level (Selena, pers. int., 2019).  
 
Selena also added that,  
Coordination is a big problem here. The difficulty is that a lot of NGOs work 
here. They are making really good architecture here. But there are some 
recommendations by shelter sectors, which they don’t follow at all. Like- do not 
put bamboo directly on the ground, they do not follow these recommendations 
hardly and when asked about the negligence, they say that’s how it works in our 
country. Now, people who are in charge of sectors, it is not possible for them to 
monitor the building and construction of every shelter. Thus they give guidelines 
to follow. But if someone does not follow it there is no way to monitor this. So 
there are gaps in the planning process and management in the camps (Selena, 




As the leading administrators of the Rohingya refugee camps, UNHCR and IOM 
follow The Sphere Handbook and the UNHCR Emergency Handbook as standards for the 
delivery of services in humanitarian responses. When individual projects are distributed to 
NGOs, they are informed about these standards, but when NGOs turn projects over to 
individual contractors, they rarely pass on this information. Noah told me that “when I was 
working, I didn't know a thing about any handbook. I didn't follow any guidelines from the 
handbook. Later, when I decided to teach about the humanitarian settlements in class, I 
found out the SPHERE handbook” (Noah, pers. int., 2019). He also added that, 
The instructions before starting a project were common, it would be a temporary 
shelter, they provided us a list of materials. We had to submit plans to get a permit 
from the site management office, though I never had to go to get the permit. My 
job was to design the structure, they basically reviewed the plan, 3D view of the 
structure, and list of materials we were using. All materials needed to be of a 
temporary nature, even we had restrictions on using brick- they would specify 
how much brick we could use and in which part of the structure. We used brick 
till 1-2 ft sill level of the structure so that rain or water could not enter inside. The 
floor could be solid but the roof was needed to be of temporary material (Noah, 
pers. int., 2019).  
 
The only guidance that is clearly passed down from the NGOs to individual planners and 
architects is how to bolster the sense of impermanence through materials and built form. 
There are also guidelines that specify how to make structures with impermanent materials 
relatively durable, but due to a lack of coordination and communication, these instructions 




5.4. LACK OF CONTEXTUAL RESPONSE IN MICRO AND MACRO-LEVEL PLANNING 
The politics of impermanence complicate any context-insensitive design, planning, 
and management approaches in the Rohingya refugee camps.  While refugee crisis is 
indeed emergencies in nature and immediate responses are needed to ensure the protection, 
safety, and well-being of refugees, which planning approaches to pursue is still a matter of 
debate among designers, planners, and architects working in refugee camps. As a planner 
working in Rohingya refugee camps, Selena is still struggling with this question. “Another 
challenge is about the conception of the planning process and the time frame of planning. 
Planning comes to us as a thing that needs thinking and analysis for a long time. And 
emergency needs instant responses, which is a different direction than long term planning” 
(Selena, pers. int., 2019). Abigail also added,  
This is a living thing. It is not a museum. It is not if I leave this thing at a place 
here, tomorrow it is going to be in the same place. So the problem also is that a lot 
of time the site plan happens, but by the time it is done, the things in the ground 
change (Abigail, pers. int., 2019).  
 
In the case of the Rohingya refugee camps, the built environment took shape during 
the early emergency period and was in large part spontaneously developed by the refugees 
themselves. Since the everyday influx of refugees was so great, they built their shelters 
wherever they could find a space using the materials provided by the aid organizations. 
Later, no formal partnerships were established with external institutions to pursue macro 
planning of the refugee camp area, and there is little involvement by planning or 
architecture organizations in the Rohingya refugee camps. An international seminar on the 
displaced community was organized at Bangladesh University of Engineering and 
Technology (BUET), the leading university in Bangladesh in January 2019, and architects, 
planners, engineers, and government officials were invited to talk about the Rohingya 
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refugee community. The scope of the seminar was limited to sustainable architecture 
solutions, and planning obstacles, possible systems; integrating refugees or local residents 
in planning processes were not discussed. Noah, one of the organizers of the seminar, 
explained why the issue of the sustainability of Rohingya refugee camps was viewed 
through such a narrow lens:  
In that seminar, we didn't talk about providing livelihood opportunities in 
Rohingya refugee camps at all. We only talked about the shelter and the 
environment. Planners and architects in Bangladesh still do not consider 
providing for livelihood opportunities within their scope of work. Architects think 
that our only responsibility is to design the structure itself, not anything else. 
That's why we have problems. Everything is interrelated and we hardly recognize 
that through our work (Noah, pers. int., 2019).  
 
While there is a lack of understanding of the scope and context of macro-level 
planning in refugee camps, there is also a lack of response to the micro-level site-specific 
context in the Rohingya refugee camps. Foreign experts and architects working remotely 
in other parts of the country sometimes fail to understand the environmental, economic, 
social, and political context of refugee camps. Thus, the insensitive approaches add to the 
adhocratic system and accentuate the transient nature of the built environment making. 
Abdal, who has been living in Cox’s Bazar and working as an architect for an NGO, 
expanded on the necessity of understanding the holistic context of the camp area by 
describing his experience working with architects who never visited the camps they were 
designing: 
 …And then they send you design with brick pointing. The workers here don't 
know about this technique. They don't take any help from engineers and architects 
at the early phase nor do they understand the camp context. Material cost and 
labor costs here are higher than in other parts of the country. They sent us a 
budget which they prepared according to material and labor costs in Dhaka. When 
they came here, we told them to sit with engineers here and to prepare the budget 
document again. The budget doubled, but the previous budget got sanctioned 
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earlier. So we have to build a project with the fund estimated in the previous 
budget. So we made alterations in the design and now it doesn't fully serve its 
purposes. The budget you need to do projects in Dhaka, it gets doubled here- that 
they don't understand (Abdal, pers. int., 2019).  
He also added,  
Aesthetics plays little role in designing buildings here. Here the prime focus 
should be functionality. No matter how beautiful your buildings are, during 
monsoon, rain would fall through the roof. That's the nature of rain here. Rain in 
Bangladesh is not as same in other parts of the world. UN agency hired some 
designers at first, who came from Russia and European countries. It is difficult for 
them to understand the nature of rain here. Here rain comes from every direction- 
that's the reality. They made shelters with a gabled roof with a slope on one side, 
with an empty space on the upper part of the shelter for wind circulation. Master 
architects from Bangladesh also have iconic designs here. But you can stay in 
those shelters when it is raining. This type of aesthetic doesn't make any sense 
here (Abdal, pers. int., 2019).  
 
Rohingya refugees are struggling every day to cope with an alien environment and society. 
When the built environment does not respond to their needs and aspirations, they feel more 





Chapter 6: Embracing the challenges of Impermanence and Adhocracy 
The factors discussed in the previous chapter contribute to the adhocratic 
management and planning of the Rohingya refugee camps, leading to a sense of 
impermanence and accentuating the Agambenian view of refugee camps as a ‘state of 
exclusion’. However, emerging practices in the Rohingya refugee camps have become 
incorporated into a strategy of ‘resiliency humanitarianism,’ which helps refugees “think 
of the camp in terms of community development, with camp life providing the experiences 
through which refugees are to refashion themselves as resilient, entrepreneurial subjects” 
(Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015, p. 348).  
 
6.1. LEVERAGING COMMUNITY CAPACITY 
In the Rohingya refugee camps, where resources and manpower are limited, 
leveraging the capacity of the refugee community can help to serve their needs. Rather than 
viewing refugees as disempowered people eking out a life in a space of exception, 
incorporating them as active participants in the development of an environment where they 
can live and interact as a community can be both cost-effective and sustainable.  
 
When refugees first arrived during the 2017 influx, they were coming in large 
numbers every day, and the aid organizations could not build enough shelters for them. 
Every household was given kits with bamboo, tarpaulin, and ropes, and they made their 
shelters any way they could. Now that the emergency period has ended, aid organizations 
seek to upgrade the shelters to a minimum standard by leveraging the capacity of refugees. 
According to Abigail,  
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We can’t forget that these people have the capacity.  So, when we are providing 
shelter, if we are looking at the community, different household has different 
needs, different household has different sizes, they have different preferences and 
in huge amount. So we dot not hope to find the same house fine for everybody. So 
when the household has freedom of choice, basically they can make arrangements 
according to their needs (Abigail, pers. int., 2019). 
 
The refugee community used to live in wooden houses in Myanmar (Figure 14). A 
typical Burmese house is elevated from the ground on sturdy wood, walls are made of 
either wood or bamboo, while thatched roofs or roofs with corrugated metal are found most 
prominently (World Monuments Fund, n.d.). Even though most of the refugees are not able 
to build with materials like brick and concrete, they are very skilled in woodwork and it is 
easy for them to apply those skills in bamboo construction. The abundance of this skill in 
the Rohingya refugee community has also shaped the decision to use bamboo as the main 
construction material in the camps. The craftsmanship of Rohingya workers also helped 
the architects and designers working in the camp to develop striking and aesthetically 
unusual structures. Mostafa designed a women-friendly space in Camp 4 Extension, and 
he explained how the skills of Rohingya refugee workers helped him create a unique built 
form that accommodates the needs and inputs of Rohingya people and provides them with 
a sense of belonging and ownership,  
In the structure (Figure 15), bamboo posts are not straight. Some are irritatingly 
tilted/off-centered – clearly an error (in “trained” architect’s eye), but not an error 
to the Rohingya laymen…. Shahin Shikder a middle-aged foreman played a vital 
role in the construction. Another one was Monir- the Rohingya bamboo 
craftsman. These two people gave a lot of design input………... In this project, 
we could make room for everyone to be creative. In other places, workers 
wouldn’t show up in time. Here, they wouldn’t leave for lunch (Mostafa, 2019). 
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Figure 14: Two types of Burmese houses made of wood and bamboo, source: World 







Figure 15: Rohingya workmen working with bamboo, woods, and learning brickworks, 
Source: Mostafa, Context BD. 
With an estimated 211,383 households in need of shelters and other basic needs, 
and with the population increasing every day, the refugee camps are getting increasingly 
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congested. This makes it difficult to find spaces to site communal structures. Also, in the 
patriarchal Rohingya community, some community services targeted towards vulnerable 
members of the community, such as awareness and counseling sessions for new mothers 
and pregnant women, are not favored by the male members of the community. Because of 
this, NGOs run a home-based model to conduct such sessions 2-3 days in a week in any 
shelter in a block. These home-based models bring both male and female members under 
the same roof, raising their awareness about gender-based oppression and violence such as 
dowry, polygamy, eve-teasing5, and rape.  
Rohingya households who give consent to hold these sessions in their shelters 
receive money to improve their shelters, including bamboo lattice, more poles, and metal 
hooks to reinforce their walls, or cement to improve their pucca6 floor. The Majhis in the 
community coordinate with the NGOs and community members to facilitate this trade of 
materials in return for hosting the awareness and counseling sessions. These home-based 
engagement models make it easier for the NGOs to gauge the needs of the refugees and 
strengthen the relationships between NGOs and the Rohingya community. Drawing on 
Simone (2008), a form of emergency governance emerges through this arrangement, 
whereby “actors increasingly rely on a variety of provisional mechanisms, including much 
informal local networking, to transmit information and to conduct negotiations” (Simone, 
2008, p. 20). The temporary use of existing shelter infrastructures for these sessions helps 
leverage community capacity and generate a sense of responsibility among the refugees, 
and the arrangement serves as a means for refugee households to improve their shelters, 
which is a significant material gain considering the transient nature of the refugee camp.  
 
5 Eve teasing is a common euphemism in South Asia for sexual harassment of women in public areas by men 
(Talboys et al, 2017).  
6 The term pucca means ‘solid’ and ‘permanent’. Pucca housing refers to dwellings that are designed to be 
solid and permanent. This term is applied to housing in South Asia built of substantial material such 




Along with these home-based models of communal services, aid organizations and 
NGOs also visit communal structures like mosques, madrasas, tea stalls, and community 
centers to better understand the necessities and aspirations of Rohingya refugees. Using the 
Rohingya youths—both male and female—as volunteers, camp managers leverage the 
power of community bonds as a resource to convey different messages to refugees. These 
refugee volunteers have become integral parts of the camp management system and a vital 
conduit of communication between the camp authorities and the refugees. Here, the 
volunteers act as interlocutors of emergency governance, opening up the possibility of 
some alternative kind of communication that itself may generate new ways of working 
(Simone, 2008).  
  
Faraz has been living in Camp 4 since September 2017. He passed the 
‘Matriculation Examination’7 in Myanmar before coming to Bangladesh, and now he 
works as a tutor. He usually spends 6 hours a day volunteering in the camps to raise 
awareness about dowry, polygamy, and child marriage to men. He met me outside the WFS 
of Camp 4 and shared his experience with me:  
I usually go to tea stalls and community centers and tell the men about the 
negative consequences of dowry, polygamy, etc. I explain to them how these are 
prohibited in our religion. I also tell people that even if these practices were 
common in our country, we cannot practice them here. The law of this country is 
different and we have to follow those rules, these Bengali people have sheltered 
us and we should not make ourselves a burden to them by practicing these. At 
first, people did not want to listen to me. Then I communicated my words through 
the imams and muajins in mosque and madrasa. People are slowly understanding 
 
7 The University Entrance Examination is commonly known as Matriculation Examination in Myanmar, it 
is an academic examination administered to 10th standard students at all schools in Myanmar, including 




what I am trying to say. They respect me. They know I am a volunteer, I work for 
that NGO. Sometimes they come to me to share their sufferings, or to inform that 
certain household is marrying off their 9 years old daughter- to refrain them from 
doing so; to tell the NGO people to fix their home or someone has not been 
working for long- to arrange some work for him. I am a volunteer only, I can’t do 
much but I can deliver those messages to the NGO. I feel happy and honored 
when people of my community listen to my words and come for help to me when 
they need it (Faraz, pers. int., 2019).  
 
6.2. CAPACITY BUILDING AND EMPOWERMENT 
Along with using local capacity as a resource, ISCG is looking for ways to improve 
communication and cooperation among agencies working in different hierarchical levels 
in the camp management system. Selena explained how these coordination efforts can be 
accompanied by technical skill building among refugees:  
A CIC might not know which areas in his/her camp fall under the flood hazard 
zone. So we need to train them, provide them with a map to understand. Let them 
know that which part of their camp is vulnerable to flood risk and what measure 
should be taken to build something on that part. If even partner organizations 
bring funding by themselves and want to build something on your site what things 
you need to discuss with them and how you should proceed with ground 
verification and other things. This process is not followed properly and there are 
some gaps in the process (Selena, pers. int., 2019).  
 
Although opportunities to learn livelihood skills are limited for Rohingya refugees, 
camp authorities are seeking to develop their skills in building resilient structures with the 
materials available to them. When I visited the ISCG office, Abigail showed me pictures 
of calendars they distribute among refugees to educate them about different construction 
techniques to make their shelters resilient against flooding, landslides, and other natural 
disasters. The calendar is printed in both English and the Burmese language (Figure 16). 
Abigail added,  
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We provided kits of materials to the households. Because we don’t have the 
capacity to build for everybody. Also, with this kit of material, we provided them 
technical guidance, technical guidance on how to build the shelter. It doesn’t give 
you the size of the shelter, but it tells you how you need to do the bracings, the 
foundations, you need to use this type of joint and things like that to make your 
shelter more durable and all the technical things (Abigail, pers. int., 2019).  
Figure 16: Calendar pages with instruction in English and Burmese languages for 




Other than these centralized efforts, NGO workers, architects, engineers, and 
planners who work with Rohingya day laborers take it upon themselves to teach refugees 
construction techniques that they can later use to upgrade their structures. For example, 
Noah investigated one of the shortcomings of Rohingya shelters and helped the refugees 
overcome it:  
The shelters Rohingya people make for themselves, they hardly provide any types 
of ventilation there. They didn't consider putting windows in their shelters. Or the 
shelters were put so close together that there was no scope of putting a window on 
sidewalls. So we placed the structures in such a way that there remained some gap 
to operate a window. I also taught them how to put windows in bamboo 
structures. I feel like this is also a kind of empowerment (Noah, pers. int., 2019). 
 
The community structures in the Rohingya refugee camps are of semi-permanent 
nature with brick walls to sill level and cement floors. However, the refugees are not 
familiar with this type of construction and hiring day laborers from outside of the camp 
increases project costs. In response to this dilemma, Musad, a structural engineer, helped 
the refugees who work with him learn these construction techniques. These refugees now 
work with him on projects: “I trained some workers in Camp 4, they didn't know how to 
do brickwork. I taught them everything with plaster finishing. Whenever I need help with 
any project, I can hire them now” (Musad, pers. int., 2019). Thus, the collaboration and 
capacity building extend a promise of future alliances, where people come to constitute an 




6.3. RESPONDING TO THE CONTEXT AND COMMUNITY ASPIRATIONS 
Fiona has been working with an NGO to develop Children Friendly Spaces (CFS) 
in the Rohingya refugee camps. Her group is looking for ways to make these centers more 
resilient as well as reflective of the culture of the Rohingya people. She said,  
After finalizing the prototype layout for the center, we thought about what 
cultural element can we put in those so that the space becomes more familiar to 
them. After having multiple focus group discussions with the community, we 
found two things- shamiana, a type of ceiling drape which acts as an insulator too, 
and keeps the room colder in hot weather. We also found out they used different 
patterns in those shamianas. We brought those two elements in our design. We 
found out that their children love the artwork. They enjoy coloring the center 
walls. Shamiana, patterns, artwork space for children- we included all those in our 
design and program of the center, it is replicable in every camp (Fiona, pers. int., 
2019).  
 
In addition to Fiona’s research group, several groups are working to make the 
camps livelier by introducing the essence of Rohingya culture into their designs. These 
designs help the refugees feel connected with the place and help pique their interest in 
taking part in the intended programming. When Abdal and his team designed a Women 
Friendly Space (WFS) in Camp-4 Extension, they used nipa palm tree8 leaves as roofing 
material instead of thatch or corrugated metal sheets. This material is popular with 
refugees, as it lasts longer than other roof types when exposed to rain. Although the 
material is known to refugees, their construction techniques are different and primitive, so 
Abdal and his team trained the refugees in new ways of using the nipa palm leaves for 
roofing. They also provided space for refugee laborers to innovate and draw on their skills 
in the development of the project. He added,   
 
8 Nypa fruticans, commonly known as the nipa palm (or simply nipa) or mangrove palm, is 
a species of palm native to the coastlines and estuarine habitats of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. It is the 
only palm considered adapted to the mangrove biome. This species is the only member of 
the genus Nypa and the subfamily Nypoideae, forming monotypic taxa (Dowe, 2010, p.83).  
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Understanding the context here is so important. Beautiful architecture doesn't add 
value here. Value can be added in one way- if you can give people comfort. If 
people find your designed space comfortable that's the real success there. The role 
of architects and planners here is to ensure the creation of a durable, functional, 
properly arranged space (Abdal, pers. int., 2019).  
 
Thus, by respecting the context of the refugee crisis and the meaning of this crisis to 
refugees’ life, and by providing them with comfort and a sense of belonging, practices of 
resiliency humanitarianism may facilitate the adaptation and survival of refugees in a 
foreign land.  
 
6.4. INFORMAL PARTNERSHIPS AND NEGOTIATIONS 
While working together, refugees and NGO workers build relationships of trust and 
cooperation that positively shape the character of the built environment. Each actor in these 
informal relationships “carries traces of past collaboration and an implicit willingness to 
interact with one another in ways that draw on multiple social positions” (Simone, 2004, 
p. 408). Musada explained that  
You need a lot of connections in every camp to get things done. Especially with 
the Majhi (Rohingya community leader). You need a large informal connection. 
the capacity and success of the total framework of a project depend on 
involvement and networking. Suppose, I am connected to one person, he is 
connected to the other two Rohingya majhis, majhis are connected to several 
other volunteers. In this way, there grows a large network and it becomes easy for 
us to accomplish any job. My phone memory is full of contacts of local majhi, 
suppliers, workers, even hooligans (Musada, pers. int., 2019).  
 
By accepting the help of this widely connected network, Musada’s team once finished a 
project in only 5 days even though it was scheduled to take one month: 
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After the initial contractor failed to finish the project before the deadline, the 
donor gave us an extension of five days. So we decided, our construction team 
would take responsibility for construction. It was Ramadan, we built the whole 
building from scratch in three days. It is not safe to stay in the camp after the 
evening. We stayed in the camp overnight, we needed a lot of laborers. I just 
asked one of my colleagues if he had enough Rohingya people who can help us in 
this project. After that, I just only remember that within three hours, a truck full of 
Rohingya laborer came to work with us. He knew several majhis in other camps 
and they gathered all these people to work in our project…..the majhi of the camp 
where we were working, kept the laborers motivated to work on this project even 
after the working hours. We also paid them for working overtime- actually, we 
paid them four times than the regular payment. We were doing all things together- 
metal framework, building envelope, roof, wooden truss, brickwork, floor finish- 
everything is going on simultaneously. Also, there is no water, water is a crucial 
component of any building construction. We decided to create a pond by laying 
polythene sheets. 4 Rohingya workers just brought water all night from the nearby 
mosque. It was Ramadan and most of the Rohingya workers used to keep fasts. At 
around midnight they decided to stop working- we then again told them to 
increase their fees and also arranged for their sehri…(Musada, pers. int., 2019).  
 
Thus, even given challenges and unfavorable conditions, the informal network of 
partnerships helped Musada keep the work going. Such informal partnerships allow for a 
more prompt and situated response to the crisis than hierarchical adhocratic systems. 
Abraham explained his experience with such informal partnerships: 
We don't have enough technical workforce. We have one engineer per camp and 
around 5000 shelters. How much he can monitor? He gets 50-60 cases of 
damaged shelter per day. If he wants to maintain protocol, it would take him days 
to solve these. In the meantime, people would continue to suffer. In my camp, I 
told that I don't always need an engineer. I would be responsible for the whole 
thing. I used my volunteers for this purpose, they go from door to door, report me 
back and I take responsibility for emergency repairing of those shelters. During 
monsoon, we get hundreds of shelter cases per day. If we want to maintain 
protocol, it would only make the situation worse. That's why, though I am not in 
the shelter team, I voluntarily proposed to do this job with my volunteers. If as a 
humanitarian volunteer, I cannot serve the refugee community well, what's the 




Through such partnerships that are cemented by familiarity and trust, emergency 
governance manifests itself through a social architecture that refugees and camp authorities 
assemble “using their time, bodies, inclinations, tools and all the material stuff that exists 
around and within them to reach and connect to public necessities’” (Simone, 2008, p. 31). 
Using these social structures, refugees negotiate with authorities in order to more promptly 
and effectively accommodate the needs of the community, thus blurring the sense of 
impermanence in the built landscapes. 
 
6.5. EVERYDAY PRACTICES OF ADAPTING AND APPROPRIATING 
When Aisha was widowed ten years ago, her husband left her a small plot in a 
village in Rakhine state, Myanmar. She worked as a tailor and lived in a wooden house 
with her son and paralyzed sister. She came to Bangladesh in September 2017 by crossing 
the bordering hills with her paralyzed sister after the Myanmar military turned their village 
into ashes. Everyone suggested she leave her sister behind, but she could not. She came to 
the Balukhali camp first, where she lived for about eight months, and then she moved to 
Camp 4 Extension when her shelter in Balukhali was demolished in a landslide. When I 
met with her inside of her shelter, she was eager to offer me a chair to sit on, but couldn’t. 
Referring to the empty shelter devoid of any furniture, she said, “Whatever little things I 
had back there, was my own. I never thought in life that I have to come to another country 
and have to live like this” (Aisha, pers. int., 2019).  
  
Having lost all they owned, people like Aisha are now trying to make a new home 
in Bangladesh. The shelters in the Rohingya refugee camp are of an impermanent, transient 
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type. They need constant maintenance. Many shelters are built lower than the street level, 
so whenever it rains, the floors of the shelters get muddy and unusable. 
 
Halima also invited me to see her shelter. It is a typical makeshift shelter, about 10 
ft by 10ft and 7.5 ft in height, without any windows or ventilation systems, housing 
Halima's whole family of 10 people. I had to bend halfway to enter her space, which is 
about 6 inches lower than the street level. It does not have any furniture or tools except for 
some sleeping mats and cooking utensils. She borrowed some cement from workers who 
were building a toilet a few months ago near her home and mixed the cement with mud to 
make her floor more durable and livable during monsoon season. She used barriers of 
polythene sheets to divide the living space into two and another barrier to divide the kitchen 
from the living space. In one corner of the kitchen, she created a separate space with 3-inch 
high bamboo sticks and sloped the floor to one corner so that water could drain through. 
This space is now used as a bathing space for the female member of the house (Figure 17).  
 
Halima’s house layout is typical of most of the makeshift refugee shelters built by 
refugees on their own. They did not have enough materials or knowledge to make shelters 
that are functional and well-ventilated, let alone with toilets and bathing facilities. 
However, in Rohingya culture, it is forbidden for women to take a bath outside or walk 
past male members of the community after taking a bath. Because of this, households in 
the refugee camp use all the space available to them to build their shelter in order to 
construct a bathing space inside. The newly designed camps have communal bathing 
facilities for females, but they hardly ever use them as they have to cross public pathways 
and might encounter men after a bath there. The newly designed homes for refugees in 
Bhasan Char also did not consider the culture and tradition of the refugee communities. 
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The architects admitted that they never consulted any Rohingya refugees during the design 
phase, nor did they consider accommodating different family structures. All rooms are 
identical in shape and size while the service facilities like kitchen, toilet, and bathing space 
are communal (Tashin, pers. int., 2019), which is not culturally appropriate for the 
Rohingya community.  




As the shelters are poorly ventilated and electricity is generated by solar panels, 
refugees try to save the electricity for the nighttime. Most of the time, the male household 
members work outside in the camp during the day, while female members spend their time 
at women-friendly community spaces, which provide a platform for women to gather and 
learn. I met Khadiza at one of the women-friendly spaces. She had finished her household 
chores before 9 am and came here as soon as the center was open: 
We do not get much electricity through the solar panel, I have to save it for the 
night, so I come here early morning with my two-year-old son and stay till 5 pm. 
Here I can have comfortable weather, I have people to talk with, to learn from. I 
learned how to write my name last month and I put my name as a signature for the 
first time this month instead of a thumb impression. This place is truly my 
Shantikhana (a place full of peace) (Khadiza, pers. int., 2019).  
 
All the women-friendly spaces in the camps are known as Shantikhana (places full of 
peace), as these provide them with capacities to be empowered (Figure 18). In the 
Rohingya community in Myanmar, the girls could go to school up to age 12 and learn 
Burmese, English, Mathematics, and Arabic. After age 12, they had to stay home learning 
household chores, knitting, and tailoring. In Bangladesh, however, there has been a major 
transformation in the life of Rohingya girls and women. First, the ration cards are issued in 
the name of the senior female member of the household, which gives them a measure of 
power vis a vis male household members they did not have in Myanmar. Second, through 
these women-friendly community spaces, NGOs have created learning and training 
opportunities which in some cases become paid opportunities. By becoming wage-earning 
members of the family, women have more authority over family decisions than they had in 
Myanmar. For example, Sukhi, an 18-year-old girl, comes to the women-friendly space 
every day. She received training in knitting and tailoring as well as basic education, and 
then started working here for six hours a day, earning BDT 1300 (USD 15.28) per month 
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(approximately two weeks’ worth of groceries for a four-member household in the Cox 
Bazar area). As she said, “I thought of buying a dress for the Eid with my first month's 
salary, but the dresses in the market were way more expensive than my monthly salary. So, 
I gave it to my father to buy meat for the Eid day, I was happy to buy food for my family 
instead” (Sukhi, pers. int., 2019).  




The government of Bangladesh has permitted NGOs to run awareness programs in 
the refugee camps, as this reduces the need for surveillance and patrolling. However, this 
initiative has created a path towards empowerment which the refugees did not have in their 
home country. Rohingya women have also become aware of their rights from different 
NGOs. NGOs hold sessions aimed to raise awareness both among men and females about 
their legal rights, about the negative consequences of child marriage, dowry, polygamy, 
and domestic violence in community centers, women-friendly spaces, and in homes, and 
also in the mosques and madrasas with the collaboration of imams and muajins. Legal help 
and advocacy are also available, and NGO workers now report that the number of cases 
dropped from 2018 to 2019. Although the tradition of dowry has not been abolished yet, 
solar panels are now demanded as dowry instead of money or gold jewelry. Because 
Rohingya men are not used to having women in positions of authority, they strongly oppose 
women going to Women Friendly Spaces (WFS) to learn about their knowledge and 
capacities. Also, while women have the opportunity to receive training, Rohingya men are 
limited to serving as day laborers or as volunteers for NGOs. 
The education of youth is another concern in the refugee community. Since the 
government of Bangladesh has not granted the Rohingyas refugee status yet, they cannot 
claim a right to education. There are learning centers, but children can only learn Burmese, 
English, and Mathematics, and only up to age 12. Bengali is not taught since it would help 
the refugees flee the camp and mix with local communities. After age 12, children have no 
formal place to receive an education. Refugees have compensated for the absence of 
educational facilities by hiring people who had received education in Myanmar to teach 
their children. Not everyone is satisfied with this informal education system. Jia, a 
volunteer working with an NGO said,  
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I can't rely on another person who just has passed the matriculation level study to 
teach my younger brothers. How can I be sure that what he is teaching to my 
brothers is the best thing to learn? If there was a school with knowledgeable 
teachers, then I would not worry about my brother's education." Still, to many, 
this informal education system is a path toward a better, dignified life. Sakina 
said, "I am paying someone BDT 800 monthly so that he comes and teaches my 
son four days a week. I do not know if I would be able to go back and when, if I 
go back or stay here for a long time, I do not want my son to grow up as an 
illiterate man. If he becomes educated, he might get a job as a volunteer here, 
which is much easier and respectable jobs than being a day laborer (Jia, pers. int., 
2019).  
  
Rohingyas used to produce their own food and were not dependent on markets in 
Myanmar. In Bangladesh, however, their options to grow food have become limited. First 
of all, the land available for agriculture in the camp area is scarce. Because of the 
overcrowded conditions in the camp, many refugees do not even have a space left over for 
a small vegetable garden. Also, even though vegetable gardens are allowed near individual 
shelters, it is forbidden to pursue large-scale agriculture or plant any large trees at the 
campsite. Growing trees near their shelters would give refugees a sense of belonging, so 
from the perspective of Bangladeshi authorities, a ban on tree planting is necessary in order 
to maintain a sense of impermanence and exclusion. Since not every household has room 
for vegetable gardens, refugees suffer from a lack of a diversified diet. They receive dry 
goods—staples like rice, lentils, oil, some spices, and snacks—from the World Food 
Program (WFP), but for meat, fish, and vegetables they rely on the nearby market or local 
food vendors who come to camps daily. Some also have adopted unique ways of growing 
vegetable trees by planting seeds in bags of mud, which also serve to protect roofs from 











Rohingya refugees do not receive any monetary aid. Their only source of cash for 
clothing and other necessities is so-called ‘cash for work,’ with refugee men and boys 
working as day laborers or volunteers with different NGOs and women and girls as 
volunteers or tailors for NGOs. Refugees will also sell or barter things they receive in aid 
like rice, lentils, and hair and beauty products, and instead buy goods that are more essential 
for them in the local market. 
 
The community bonds also help refugees cope with this transient state of living. 
Whenever people have a surplus of building materials like bamboo and ropes, they create 
a space outside of their house known as a ‘macha’ where people sit and speak with 
neighbors and other community members. NGOs have introduced different in-home 
services like sessions about pre-natal care, care guidelines for pregnant women and 
newborn babies, and workshops about healthy eating and hygiene. Refugee household can 
give permission to run these interactive sessions in their shelters, which provides another 
opportunity for the community to learn together and communicate with each other. Refugee 
volunteers also have become an essential part of the community as they act as a liaison 
between the NGOs and refugees, which is especially important for households that need 
special care, such as single-person households and those with elderly and handicapped 
household members. Since the volunteers are also members of the same community and 
familiar with Rohyngia culture and tradition, they can assist more newly arrived refugees 
in navigating camp structures and politics. These community bonds and sense of 
interdependency is a valuable asset that they do not want to lose. Jamal, an NGO worker 
said, 
Refugees have created a community here where they live now, they do not want 
to leave that easily. If you tell them today that you will be given a better shelter, 
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better facilities elsewhere and you will have to move, they won't. Wherever they 
go, they will go with the community, the relatives they have here. That is another 
reason why Rohingyas are not willing to move to Bhasan Char. If you are taking 
only 100,000 people there, they know they might have to leave a part of their 
community, their family behind, and they won’t do it (Jamal, pers. int., 2019).  
 
Although these settlements are intended to produce a sense of impermanence, the 
community bonds developed by refugees provide them with a feeling of belonging and 
inclusion. Despite all their sufferings and daily struggles, refugees prefer to live in the camp 
because they believe that staying there can ensure their return to their homes in Myanmar. 
Mahmuda, a 15-year-old girl who was born in Bangladesh, explained that her father came 
from Myanmar to Bangladesh during the 1991 influx and they used to live in Chittagong 
city. Following the 2017 influx, he moved to the refugee camp with his family. “My father 
said that he wanted to go back to his home back to Myanmar. If we stay in the refugee 
camp, then perhaps we can go back this time,” Mahmuda recalled (Mahmuda, pers. int., 
2019). 
 
Ultimately, seen through these everyday practices by Rohingya refugees, the bleak 
Agambenian picture of the camp is blurred and we come to understand the agency of 
refugees. As Turner suggests, through these practices, “social life, power relations, 
hierarchies, and sociality are remolded in the camp” (Turner, 2016, p. 143).  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Ilcan and Rygiel (2015) suggest that the social architectures described in the 
previous chapter prepare refugees for the idea that camp life is not temporary and 
transitional. In so doing, they turn refugees into “neoliberal resilient subjects who are 
encouraged to adapt to, rather than resist, the conditions of their humanitarian sufferings” 
(Ilcan &Rygiel, 2015, p. 348). However, I would argue that everyday negotiations with 
camp authorities do not necessarily increase the sense of belonging to the host country nor 
a greater acceptance of their refugee status. That is to say, the need for permanence is not 
synonymous with the need for acceptance and belongingness. These tactics only reflect the 
aspirations of the refugees to live their life with minimum human dignity and protection, 
so that they can go back to their country with adequate resources to rebuild their 
communities. This aspiration manifests through their reluctance to move to Bhasan Char, 
which promises a ‘better’ version of refugee life through the provision of needed services 
and facilities in exchange for the exclusion from other communities (both refugee and host 
communities). The Rohingya refugees do not want a ‘permanent and secure’ future that 
provides them with no promises to return to Myanmar.  
 
Thus, the planning of Rohingya refugee camps requires a different approach that is 
not premised on providing a sense of impermanence through adhocracy. Planning 
approaches towards refugee camps should instead be “multiplanar- a relational approach 
of dynamic complexity to understanding and working with contingencies of place, time, 
and actant behavior” (Hillier, 2008, p. 24). By understanding the factors that lead to the 
adhocratic camp management system as well as the field-level practices, politics, and 
negotiations among different planning actors, a multiplanar approach may “offer potential 
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for thinking through collaboratively the ways in which particular strategic imaginaries 
might affect human and non-human actants” (Hillier, 2008, p. 42). She goes on to say, in a 
comment with great relevance for the Rohingya refugee camps, that “plans and strategies 
are never so much complete as ‘enough for now’….it is a rhizomic consequentialist 
approach: a what might happen if…’ approach that offers the potential to think otherwise” 
(Hillier, 2008, p. 42). A refugee situation ultimately culminates in three ways—
repatriation, relocation, and integration—and planning strategies may embrace a 
combination of all three potential outcomes. That is to say, starting with the emergency 
period of a refugee crisis, a multiplanar planning approach would seek ways to 
accommodate all possible end solutions. Rather than keeping the refugees in a state of 
exclusion, we need to provide them with opportunities, services, and facilities to ensure 
their quality of lives as an individual. But we also need to see them as members of a 
community and be cognizant of their demands, needs, and power, thus facilitating their 
transition to a ‘post-refugee’ life. From a multi-planar perspective, plans are never 
complete nor completely outcome-oriented. Instead, this approach acknowledges the 
constraints of impermanence and adhocracies but also welcomes the everyday 
appropriating practices of refugees. 
 
By keeping refugees isolated and excluded, refugee camps constitute transient 
spaces designed to reproduce a sense of impermanence and to depoliticize the refugee 
population. The introduction of humanitarian agencies to manage the refugee camp through 
superficial neoliberal goals has led to an adhocratic governance system, whereby refugees 
are required to become resilient participants in the maintenance of the camps without 
demanding changes to facilities and services. However, this study of existing Rohingya 
refugee camps in Bangladesh and the proposed relocation plan for Rohingya has shown 
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that the meaning of impermanence changes depending on the planning context. Once the 
rule of exclusion of refugees from the immediate surrounding areas has been established, 
the line between permanence and impermanence becomes blurred. This is because the 
sense of impermanence and the adhocratic governance system of refugee camps are not 
merely products of political machinations. They also stem from the interactions of 
numerous other factors: the tradition of technocratic top-down planning practice, the 
paradoxical combination of humanitarian services and neoliberal development agendas, 
and the geopolitical and socioeconomic conditions of both the refugees and the host 
communities.  
  
While refugees are viewed as passive recipients of aid, refugees situate themselves 
as an active negotiating actor in the impermanent and adhocratic realm of the refugee camp. 
By using their capacity, cooperation, and connections as human capital, by utilizing the 
porous spatiality of the camps to shape their built environment, and by administering 
emergency governance, Rohingya refugees are transforming the politics of impermanence 
and adhocracy in order achieve their rights. Everyday practices of appropriating do not 
necessarily translate into acceptance and belonging to the host community, but instead 
serve to gain a measure of control over their future, despite strategies of exclusion and the 
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